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The City has always benefited from the presence of international talent 
among its workforce and management.  Street names such as Lombard 
Street remind us of the impact of foreign bankers as far back as the Middle 
Ages, while institutions such as Schroders and Rothschilds originated from 
international enterprise in the 18th and 19th centuries.  The City has remained 
open to talent from abroad through to the present day; and, with something 
like a quarter of its employees coming from outside the UK, must have a 
strong claim to be the most cosmopolitan of all international financial 
services.  The presence of such talent is one of the key factors underpinning 
our global competitiveness.   
 
Migration from abroad has also played a key long-term role in London as a 
whole.  Once again, the modern age has seen an acceleration in arrivals.  
The foreign-born population has grown from 1 to 2 million during the last 20 
years.  In the last decade alone, London has experienced a net gain of some 
800 thousand immigrants from an increasingly diverse range of countries of 
origin.  
 
Despite the scale of this globalization of our resident population, there has 
been surprisingly little analysis of its impact on London’s economy, social 
fabric and governance.  With this in mind, we commissioned the London 
School of Economics to produce a research report specifically focussed on 
the composition and dynamics of migrant flows, and their impact on the 
housing and labour markets.  In addition, we asked the consultants to 
consider the consequences of increasing diversity for the government of 
London and how it is financed. 
 
Despite the public data limitations that bedevil any research into the UK’s 
population and workforce, the authors have produced a compelling analysis 
of London’s new inhabitants.  Overall, they are young and are likely to have 
had significantly more education and possess higher level qualifications than 
the comparable age cohort of the London-born population.  Many of those 
coming from richer countries tend to be temporary residents, coming here for 
several years to work (often in the City) and to enjoy the benefits of a 
dynamic global city, before returning home.  Those from other countries are 
far more likely to be permanent additions to the population, exercising a 
long-term effect on the housing and labour markets. 
 
The impact of migration on London’s already strained housing stock might 
have been limited to date due to relative youth and low household formation 
rates.  This situation is likely to change when, as the report forecasts, we reach 
a point where the majority of children in the capital will be born into families 
who have come from overseas.   
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The impact on the labour market has been more immediate, with the 
evidence suggesting that better educated new arrivals are displacing 
London-born workers from the lower end of the labour market.  This 
phenomenon might be expected to extend further and further up the 
earnings scale as immigrants integrate and take fuller advantage of their 
education and skills. 
 
From a local government point of view, perhaps the most compelling section 
of the report is that dealing with the financial implications of international in-
migration.  London receives a much larger share of the current wave of new 
arrivals than the rest of the country.  The centralization of revenue collection, 
and relative rigidity of the formulae used to re-allocate funds for local 
spending, means that neither the GLA nor the London boroughs receive 
financial resources proportionate to the increasing size and diversity of their 
populations.  Unless this balance is redressed, the strain on local government 
finances can only increase, with negative consequences for the quality of the 
services they are expected to provide.  It would be a tragedy if the current 
positive impact of new migrants on London’s competitiveness and 
sustainability were to be increasingly undermined by inadequate public 
financing.  This report points the way towards the more comprehensive 
analysis required to support the major shifts in public policy necessary to 
ensure that this does not happen.  I trust the report’s findings will be heard at 
all levels of government. 
 
Michael Snyder 
London 
July 2007 
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Executive Summary 
 
• Twenty years of strong inward migration, with net gains totalling some 800 
thousand people since 1998, have produced both overall population 
growth and a much more cosmopolitan mix in London.  The foreign born 
population has grown from 1 to 2 million over the 20 year period.  
Whereas, in 1986 just 6 countries of origin accounted for half of this 
population, now it takes 15 to do so.  
• Particular elements, such as asylum seekers and recent A81 migrants, have 
contributed to this growth but are only minor parts of a strong trend driven 
by international forces combined with London’s particular attractions.  
These trends appear set to continue. 
• Net immigration into London from abroad tends to displace some existing 
residents, who move out into other parts of the Greater South East – 
though the short-run effect is nearer to ‘one for two’ than ‘one for one.’  
This substantially reduces the impact of immigration on London population 
growth, while probably intensifying that on the population mix. 
 
Characteristics of migrants 
• The new migrants come from many places, but share characteristics of 
relative youth, above average qualifications, and positive ratings by 
employers. 
• There are major limitations in the official statistics about migrants, notably 
on out-migration, whether by the UK-born or by temporary residents here.  
Similarly it is not possible to track migrants’ subsequent moves within the 
UK.  The basic facts are reasonably clear, but the picture is complicated, 
and our current understanding is only partial. 
• Those who come from richer countries tend to remain for shorter periods 
(particularly the most qualified), while those from less developed countries 
are far more likely to make London their long-term home. 
 
Impacts on the London economy   
• Two distinct positive effects of migration are its qualitative impact on the 
London labour force and economy, through diversity, flexibility, 
international experience and skill sets; and its quantitative contribution 
through expanding labour supply and thus enabling employment growth 
and reducing upward wage pressure. 
• Migrants work in most types of job in London.  There are concentrations 
mainly from richer countries in the financial and business services.  Many 
work in catering and hospitality.  A8 in-migrants are particularly 
concentrated in construction. 
• Those coming from less developed countries tend (at least initially) to take 
up lower status jobs than their qualifications would warrant.  Over time this 
differentiation tends to disappear. 
• An effect of the concentration of migrants in the worst paid segment of 
the labour market has been a significant downward pressure on wages at 
the bottom end of the market.  This seems to have encouraged job 
growth in these occupations, but earnings among workers in this sector 
                                                 
1 A8 – the 8 eastern and central European accession countries of the EU25. 
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have suffered, falling behind growth in the cost of living.  At the same time 
the gap between earnings levels for this group in London and those in the 
rest of the UK has been substantially eroded.   
• High levels of net inward migration in the working age range (averaging 
about 70 thousand per annum (p.a.)) have continued since 2000, despite 
both the substantial cut-back in numbers of asylum-seekers and the fact 
that London employment growth has slowed down. 
• So far, this imbalance in labour supply and demand trends has been 
mitigated particularly by increased out-commuting, with no evident 
increase in unemployment in London.  Across the wider set of south 
eastern regions including London, there may, however, have been some 
downward effect on labour market participation.  
• Both employment rates and earnings among new migrants tend to be 
lower than for otherwise comparable Londoners.  This suggests that their 
potential is not being fully used at present by London employers. 
 
Accommodating the migrant population 
• New migrants form fewer households than their indigenous counterparts.  
They also consume less housing and live disproportionately in the private 
rented sector.  Over time their housing demands increase as incomes rise 
and people become more settled – but if there is significant turnover in 
migrants this longer term impact is more limited.  
• Additional demand from migrants and foreign investors, have put pressure 
on house prices.  In the private rented sector, however, rents have 
remained fairly stable as demand increases – suggesting that supply has 
become more elastic. 
• Migrants are not usually eligible for social housing immediately on entry.  
Those who remain on low incomes and in poor housing conditions, 
especially those with families, will be eligible for assistance and may obtain 
priority if they become homeless.  This can add to existing tensions 
between meeting housing need among newer entrants and perceived 
housing entitlements among established residents.   
 
Use of public services by migrants 
• The majority of migrants use relatively fewer public services than 
indigenous households – and are therefore less costly to the public purse.  
There are, however, additional pressures from the diverse needs of 
migrants, and the claims of those in the weakest situation.  The costs of 
housing, translation services, health provision, schools and social security 
benefits have increased as a result of the additional needs of some new 
migrants to London. 
• Finance to secure additional local government services is often not fully 
underwritten by central government, resulting in councils having to make 
statutory provision without an adequate resource base.  London faces 
particular problems when revisions are made to estimates of migrant 
arrivals (and thus local populations), as these lead to unpredictable shifts  
in central grant support to local government, the NHS and other services. 
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Summary 
• Social cohesion within London has generally remained strong during the 
recent period of rapid in-migration.  There is some risk that this could 
change if there were a long-term mismatch between available resources 
and additional spending needs. 
• London is experiencing an unprecedented period of sustained high levels 
of international migration, of very diverse kinds, with potentially major 
impacts on the growth and competitiveness of London.  This first 
assessment has identified some of the key effects, especially with respect 
to the labour market, housing and local services.  It has also shown that 
the relationships between increased in-migration and the functioning of 
the capital are complex.  Substantial further research will be required fully 
to assess their overall impact on the London economy. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Migration, which is often a politically-contested and awkward subject, is also 
seen as a powerful indicator of a city’s modernity, openness and its willingness 
to adapt to economic progress.  City leaders tend to talk optimistically about 
the benefits of a cosmopolitan population and about the flow of new people 
into their city. 
 
Thus, the introduction to the Mayor’s London Plan stated that London is ‘the 
most culturally diverse city in the world’.  It went on to make a strong case for 
international in-migration:  
 
‘London’s diversity is one of its great historical social, economic and 
cultural strengths.  New arrivals moving to London from overseas will 
contribute further to it.  London is already a highly diverse city, one of 
the most multi-racial in the world.  Nearly one-third of Londoners are 
from black and minority ethnic communities…and) a significant growth 
in (these) is projected over the next 15 years.  International in-and out-
migration has been high and is projected to remain so’ (MoL, 2004, 
p26). 
 
London is not alone in seeing migration as a powerful asset.  The Mayor of 
New York’s Commission for Immigrant Affairs has stated: 
 
‘If New York City is the capital of the world, it's because of the energy 
and vision of generations of immigrants.  Immigrants are 36% of New 
York's population and 43% of the labor force.  They continue a long 
history of spurring growth, fuelling our economy, and building dynamic 
communities’ (NYMOIA, 2007). 
 
The Mayor of Toronto, David Miller, has linked his city’s large immigrant 
populations more specifically to Toronto’s potential to take advantage of 
growth in China and India in the years ahead: 
 
‘It happens that Toronto's two largest groups of immigrants are from 
China and South Asia.  That means we have a natural advantage in 
this shifting global economy.  We already have the cultural and 
business links to make Toronto a hub of trade and business between 
North America and Asia’ (CoT, 2005). 
 
Mayors in other cities would make similar remarks.  Migration is seen as 
evidence that a city is ‘capital of the world’ or ‘the most culturally diverse city 
in the world’, with the implication that this is a good thing.  New migrants are 
believed to strengthen the economy and also provide a signal of the city’s 
global reach.  Set against such confident judgements, hard evidence is, 
however, much more difficult to pin down.  The aim of this report is to start the 
task of building a relevant evidence base for the case of London.  This 
involves identifying those impacts about which knowledge is available – but 
also the significant areas of ignorance where more evidence needs to be 
gathered, and those fields where actual impacts will depend on how the city 
responds to the opportunities and challenges that migration now present.   
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At the start of the 21st century, London is in a confident and expansive mood, 
thanks both to growing incomes in its professional financial and business 
services (and the spending power of those who work in them) and a symbolic 
turnaround in population trends within Greater London after half a century of 
contraction.  The immediate causes of these two developments are, in the 
first case, the combination of a very strong competitive position in these 
sectors built up over decades, with a burgeoning (national and international) 
demand for sophisticated services, and in the second case an extraordinary 
growth in international immigration, not in itself unique to London, but 
scarcely matched elsewhere for its scale and diversity.  Two key questions 
now are: 
 
• Whether these two developments are causally linked, and mutually 
supportive in a way that will help underwrite further expansion; and 
• how closely they are, or can be, connected in labour market terms, with 
both: 
• international migration supplying the kinds of labour that London 
requires to sustain its competitive advantage, and  
• the growth sectors offering the employment opportunities making 
effective use of the labour potential offered by the new migrants, 
and successfully integrating them in social and economic terms. 
 
As highlighted in publications linked to Gordon Brown’s last two Budget 
speeches (HM Treasury, 2006, 2007), London is now also identified statistically 
as the UK region with the lowest employment (and highest unemployment) 
rates among its population – which seems a great paradox for such a 
successful city in overall economic terms.  Another question to be addressed 
is whether the discovery of this phenomenon is somehow linked to a couple 
of decades of large scale immigration into London – either because 
population growth is running ahead of (a much less certain) expansion in 
employment, or because migrants are feeding particularly into the bottom 
end of the labour market and undermining the position of those Londoners 
who were already occupying the weakest positions in a high skill economy. 
 
Another key issue is whether the city can actually accommodate within its 
borders the scale of growth that immigration has brought.  For decades 
Londoners’ demands for more space to match their rising incomes, have led 
an increasing proportion to move out, allowing lower densities to be 
achieved inside Greater London.  The reversal of population decline in the 
city over the last 20 years may well owe something to changes in tastes 
among an increasingly educated population, some of whom attach greater 
weight to accessibility to the cultural and social opportunities of the city than 
to more space (at ground level), as well as the changing values of planners.  
It also (perhaps preponderantly) seems to reflect the willingness of migrants to 
live at substantially higher densities than established residents.   
 
Two questions of importance then are: 
 
• how far it is the case that the presence of increased numbers of migrants 
has been responsible for densification and (thus) the new population 
growth within London; and 
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• whether such differences in housing aspirations will be sustained over time, 
and thus whether further densification can be expected, without a steady 
acceleration in the rate of international immigration. 
 
Beyond these relatively straightforward labour and housing market issues, 
there are more profound ones about the potential long-run impacts of a 
much more diverse population on the city’s creativity and its political culture.  
These are mostly beyond the scope of this study, which is focused on 
economic impacts and currently visible changes.  There are, however, 
important short-term aspects to both of these, one of which concerns the 
effects of migration on demands for public services and the political/fiscal 
issues involved in responding to such demands at a local level within the city. 
 
Until recently, rather little has been known about the significance of migration 
for the London economy.  Since, and even during, the earlier post-war waves 
of Commonwealth immigration into London, the focus has been more on 
ethnicity/race than on migration itself, largely because discrimination and its 
secondary effects have continued to impact on the London-born children 
and grandchildren of these earlier migrants.  There is, however, currently a 
burgeoning of research about many aspects of migration, including its 
economic effects.  Important elements in this work are underway but are still 
in quite early stages.  The intentions of this study are thus largely exploratory: 
to survey what can readily be established about the scale and role of the 
new migration in relation to the London economy from accessible data 
sources and from papers emerging from current research; and to assess both 
the significance of these and key areas of ignorance requiring more focused 
research effort.   
 
To pursue this, the following chapters first set the context for the current wave 
of immigration into London, in relation particularly to London’s history of 
receiving migrants (Chapter 2); then examine the scale and character of 
migration over the past 20 years (Chapter 3); before considering its 
significance and impacts in relation to the housing system (Chapter 4); labour 
market/competitiveness (Chapter 5) and; public service provision (Chapter 
6).  A concluding chapter draws the threads together, and identifies key 
points for consideration in relation to public policy in London and 
development of further research. 
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2 Historic and overall trends 
 
2.1  The history of migration to London 
London is often described as an ‘international city’, once primarily in relation 
to its imperial role, but since the 1980s more broadly as a ‘global city’ serving 
the whole world.  The main justification for this title has been the 
concentration of many dynamic ‘command and control’ functions for an 
increasingly integrated world economy, most notably in and around the City 
itself (e.g. Sassen, 1991).  An equally remarkable and even more pervasive 
kind of internationalisation of the city in this period has been in its population, 
which has become dramatically more diverse over the past 20 years, with 
large numbers of new migrants from many places, most of which (unlike the 
homes of earlier post war migrants) were never part of the British Empire. 
 
The reasons why people have travelled from overseas to London – for work, 
refuge, stimulus, profit, personal development and pleasure – are almost as 
varied as their origins, but by no means unique to this city.  Many large urban 
centres have a history of immigration, some on a much larger scale than was 
the case for London – for example Toronto, Los Angeles, Sydney and New 
York – but these too have experienced large new waves over recent 
decades which have a very similar character to that affecting London.  Other 
European cities, like Paris and Amsterdam, are also experiencing more 
cosmopolitan (as well as larger) inflows now, if not to the same degree as 
London.  In all these cases it is very much bound up with their urban 
character, their openness, economic vitality, existing cultural diversity and 
concentrations of economic, social and power.  The relationship, however, 
seems to be a two way one, with a strong belief at least that the presence 
(and turnover) of migrants from a wide variety of origins will contribute 
strongly to all of these urban assets – if also probably to the accompanying 
tensions and problems endemic in such cities.  
 
The connection of international migration with high-level political power is 
clearly a very old one.  Three monarchs came from Europe and a number of 
others married foreigners.  Strong connections were developed with rulers 
and royal families in many other European countries.  With all these links and 
transitions there came larger groups of foreign migrants, some to the courts 
themselves, and some to pursue the commercial opportunities opened up by 
the internationalisation of the monarchy. 
 
London’s trading role was also a major stimulus to migration, and migrants 
contributed greatly to it from the very beginning.  The City developed as a 
centre of overseas trade from the period of Roman occupation onwards, and 
the fact that its main city was a wholly Roman creation, with no native past, 
marked Britain out from virtually all other provinces of Rome: ‘London began 
as a city of foreigners, and long continued as a government town, whose 
resident authority overawed native British custom’ (Morris, 1982, 280-281).   
 
By the end of the Roman period in the 5th century, however, most of 
London’s  population would have been born here, and its subsequent decline 
halted further immigration.  When it re-emerged as an Anglo-Saxon city 
around 600, it was settled by migrants from other parts of England, who were 
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assimilated through both intermarriage and peaceful commerce (Ackroyd, 
2000).  After further occupation by Danes, English rule was established by King 
Alfred, bringing an era of security and trading success, which was maintained 
after the Norman conquest.  People from many different countries passed 
through the capital, as traders, diplomats, servants and, later, slaves.  In the 
13th century, the City of London was described as ‘overflowing with Italians, 
Spanish, Provencals and Poitevins’ (Selwood, Schwarz and Merriman, 1996).  
Lombard Street in the City became established as a banking centre after 
Lombard merchants from northern Italy settled there in the 12th century.   
 
By the 15th century there were estimated to be 1850 foreigners in London, 
rising to 3,000 in 1501 (Selwood, Schwarz and Merriman, 1996; Thrupp, 1969).  
Londoners would from time to time react against the privileges granted to 
such outsiders, ‘and, on occasion, vented their fury and prejudice upon 
them’ (Barron, 2004, p14).  The monarchy, however, was often enthusiastic 
about the potential for taxation and lending provided by such overseas 
traders: increasing the power of foreigners (who were unlikely to form a power 
bloc) was more attractive than strengthening London and its merchant class 
(who, in the City of London, were politically powerful).  The city’s willingness to 
attract and (for most of the time) tolerate foreign traders contributed to its 
mercantile success.  In the period prior to the Reformation, London seems to 
have flourished as a ‘truly cosmopolitan city’ (Barron, 2004, p115), though a 
subsequent wave of Huguenot immigration into London (fleeing Catholic 
persecution) provoked alarm during the mid-1560s.   
 
By the middle of the 17th century, London’s expansion was fuelled entirely by 
migration, mostly domestic but partly international.  Jews, who had been 
expelled from the country 350 years earlier, were allowed back in by Oliver 
Cromwell.  Many fled to London from anti-Semitism in continental Europe, 
building a Sephardic community of some 20 thousand, notably in Spitalfields 
where they lived side-by-side with the Huguenots – in an area now settled by 
Bangladeshis.  There were also between 5 and 10 thousand black inhabitants 
in Georgian London (Porter, 1994).  High levels of immigration and economic 
growth were seen as leading to higher wages and costs, making London 
expensive compared both to the rest of the country and other cities in 
Europe.  These high wages and costs appear, however, to have energised its 
economy, not damaged it (Porter, 1994).  Moreover, overseas traders began 
to take an active part in the city’s political life.   
 
During the mid-19th century, famine in Ireland pushed people toward British 
(as well as American) cities in search of work, with 46 thousand emigrants 
settling in London, added to the 84 thousand who already lived there.  The 
city’s Jewish population doubled between 1850 and 1880, especially as 
people fled pogroms in central Europe, Poland and Russia.  The East End 
became a heavily overcrowded district of new migrants.  By 1901, 42 
thousand Russians and Poles lived in Stepney.  Many from this community later 
achieved prominence in business, science and the arts.  
 
It was not only the poor and dispossessed that moved to London as the city 
grew.  The city’s wealth and attractions brought aristocrats, investors and 
leisure-seekers from across the world.  The Great Exhibition in 1851 was a 
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publicly-backed initiative to show London as what would today be called a 
‘world city’.  The strength of its financial markets with their openness (at this 
stage) to foreign participants brought European financiers to the city with 
innovative practices that reinforced its competitive position (Michie, 1998).  
London also became a place where immigrants could foment ideas in a 
relatively anonymous and tolerant political environment.  ‘London was a 
place where dangerous continental anarchists could drop out of sight and 
become a brooding presence’ (Nash, 2005, p114). 
 
2.2 The Twentieth century 
During the first Great Age of Migration (and globalisation) before the First 
World War, the UK (like Europe in general) was involved primarily as a place of 
origin rather than as an important destination for international flows – except 
in its role as asylum for refugees from Russia.  During the first half of the 20th 
century, particularly in the 20s and 30s, international migration was much 
more limited – and London’s core activities became more insulated from 
international influences – while the emergence of a new round of refugee 
flows in the late 1930s had rather little impact on the UK, although it brought 
some distinguished migrants to London.  
 
In Europe generally, the period since the Second World War has been one of 
very much larger scale migration, both into and within the continent, though 
with markedly shifting patterns, several of which have had distinctive impacts 
on London.  In broad terms, we can distinguish four sub-periods in which 
different processes have operated to quite different effects: 
 
Post-war resettlement: On the continent, the aftermath of the war (and the 
division of Germany) brought massive movements, with many millions of 
people being repatriated, forcibly displaced or voluntarily seeking asylum.  
The driving forces were almost entirely political, but with very major economic 
effects, notably in providing a large boost to West German labour supply 
growth, continuing through the 1950s until the Wall halted the refugee flow 
from East Germany.  The impact of these flows on the UK was more modest, 
but a few hundred thousand ‘European Volunteer Workers’ were recruited by 
the post-war Labour government, primarily from Displaced Persons camps, 
and directed to employment in ‘essential industries’, mostly production 
sectors where labour was in short supply.  At the time this source of supply was 
chosen over the importation of non-white workers from British colonies, who 
were seen as less socially acceptable (Kay and Miles, 1992).  Because of the 
targeted sectors, these flows were mostly directed to areas of the country 
away from London. 
 
Managed labour importation: Through the 1950s and 1960s, most northern 
European countries actively promoted labour immigration as a tool of 
economic policy, drawing in workers from outside northern Europe on a basis 
initiated and managed jointly by a combination of the states concerned and 
major employers in search of replacement labour.  The arrangements took 
different forms in different countries, with a major contrast between the 
Germanic nations.  Citizenship was defined by descent and foreign migrants 
had the status strictly of guest workers (gastarbeiter), and the main colonial 
powers (such as the UK), where most of the new migrants either already had 
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citizenship rights or could readily acquire them.  There were also significant 
differences in the sectors to which migrants were recruited, with a German 
focus on expanding manufacturing sectors, contrasting both with a British 
emphasis on public services (and later on less competitive industries) and a 
French tendency for more migrants to go into private services/construction.  
In the UK, though the interest of West Indians in coming to Britain (and 
particularly London) was signalled by the arrival of The Empire Windrush at 
Tilbury in 1948, large scale migration from there only followed at the end of 
the 1950s, thanks to recruitment initiatives by London Transport, and of the 
National Health Service, continuing until it was largely cut off by the 1962 
Immigration Act.   
 
Immigration to London continued through the 1960s though, with a new influx 
of south Asians, including refugees from Kenya and Uganda.  Recruitment of 
large numbers of Pakistanis at this time to work in a number of increasingly 
uncompetitive manufacturing industries mostly brought migrants to northern 
cities rather than to London.  As far as tradable goods were concerned, 
however, it became increasingly feasible and attractive to use cheap labour 
supplies in situ, by off-shoring work.   
 
Halting the inflow: This planned importation was halted in the early-mid 1970s 
for reasons primarily associated with the oil price shock and rising 
unemployment in domestic economies, though British restrictions had come in 
earlier, for essentially political reasons.  In the gastarbeiter countries, in 
particular, there was an expectation now that migrants would go home, 
reducing the size of the foreign-born population, for whom there was no 
longer an economic need.  Even with strong encouragement in some places, 
this mostly did not occur.  Cyclical (back and forward) movement was greatly 
reduced, however, facing earlier migrants with a much starker choice 
between permanently returning ‘home’, or staying on a more settled basis, 
which is what the great majority did.  From the 1980s onward, government 
policies in the main migrant countries increasingly complemented restrictions 
on further primary immigration2 with efforts to enhance settlement and 
integration among previous immigrants, including acceptance of secondary 
migration as a means of family reunification.   
 
New (Post-Fordist)3 migration: From the later 1980s, long-distance migration 
into western Europe revived on a much more heterogeneous and less 
managed basis.  In particular, there was an upsurge in asylum-seeking (from 
eastern Europe and from war-torn areas of the Third World), in movements by 
the highly skilled, and in spontaneous economic migration by individuals from 
many areas of the world now in possession of much better information about 
available work opportunities abroad, both through globalised media, and 
contacts with earlier migrants.  Though immigration controls remained in force 
they were less effective in stemming this new migration.  Globally the numbers 
of people living outside their country of origin are estimated to have grown by 
                                                 
2 i.e. migration of single people or principal family breadwinners.  
3 Post-Fordism refers to a shift in the balance of economic activity over the last 25 years or so 
from one characterised by mass production of relatively standard goods in large firms or state 
organisations, to a more flexible, diverse and market-oriented mix.  Post-Fordist migration shares 
similar features, contrasting with the more organised and homogeneous flows of the 1960s.  
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80% between 1980 and 20004.  One factor in this was the great upsurge in 
refugee flows, principally from one  Third World country to another, but also 
involving at the peak of asylum seeking in 2001 some 638 thousand arrivals in 
OECD countries (with some 15% coming to the UK). 
 
The reduced role of major employers in shaping this new diverse set of flows, 
the much enlarged set of origins, and the increased representation of 
graduates in them all suggest that major cities (especially those with a range 
of established minority populations) should be of special significance as 
destinations for the new migration.  At an international scale, the OECD( 2004) 
reports that current immigrant flows into advanced economies are 
particularly concentrated in areas which are: economically attractive, urban 
in character, close to relevant ports of entry, and with existing concentrations 
of potential immigrant groups.  
 
London has certainly figured prominently in the upsurge of immigration to the 
UK over the past 20 years, typically receiving about 40% of the gross inflows 
(three times its population share).  In net terms the concentration has been 
even more striking – indeed until the late 1990s London effectively accounted 
for 85-90% of additions to the UK’s migrant stock, coming down to 55-60% in 
the last 5 years, as migration has started to take off in other regions.  The 
impact on London’s own population over the last 20 years has been 
dramatic, both quantitatively and qualitatively.  The chronic population 
decline of the previous quarter century has been replaced by net growth (of 
around 50 thousand p.a.); the share of foreign born in the population has 
almost doubled over 20 years, reaching about one-third of the total, and the 
number of nationalities heavily represented among its residents has grown 
enormously, with a much larger proportion now coming from non-English 
speaking countries (Table 2.1).   
 
Table 2.1: The cosmopolitanisation of London’s population 1986-2006 
 
 1986 
 
2006 
Foreign born population 1.17 million 2.23 million 
Proportion of total 17.6% 30.5% 
Share coming from 
former British territories 
76% 59% 
Dominant origins: 
Number of countries 
contributing 
majority of migrant 
stock 
 
6 countries 
 
Ireland, India, Kenya, 
Jamaica, Cyprus, 
Bangladesh 
 
 
15 countries 
 
Previous 6 + 
Nigeria, Poland, Sri 
Lanka, Ghana, South 
Africa, Pakistan, 
Somalia, USA, Turkey 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
                                                 
4 From 96 to 174 million according to UN statistics. 
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In this respect, London has truly become a global city, rather than simply an 
ex-imperial one.  A recent international comparison (Benton-Short et al., 2004) 
places London just in the top quartile of international cities (24th out of 116) in 
terms of its proportion of foreign born, well behind places such as Dubai, 
Miami and Amsterdam – all clearly smaller than London – and with a smaller 
absolute number of foreign born than New York, Los Angeles or Toronto 
(where 2 million foreign born represent 45% of the city population).  On a 
broader ‘total immigrant index’, reflecting diversity as well as the overall share 
and number of foreign born, this study places London in 5th position, just 
ahead of Amsterdam and well ahead of any other European city (Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2: The Top 10 international cities for immigration and population 
diversity  
 
Cities 
 
Total immigration index 
New York 2.11 
Toronto 1.92 
Dubai 1.89 
Los Angeles 1.79 
London 1.28 
Amsterdam 1.13 
Vancouver 1.08 
Sydney 1.06 
Miami 1.03 
Melbourne 0.86 
Source: Benton-Smith et al., 2004. 
Note: The ‘total immigration index’ presented here combines measures of absolute and relative immigrant 
stock, together with its diversity in terms of national origins5.  
 
Though from a rather different starting position, London could be seen as now 
following the course pursued by New York a decade or so earlier.  Though 
New York had always been a city of immigrants (or their descendants), from a 
variety of, mostly European origins, the influx was very severely cut back from 
1924 until 19656 (Moorhouse, 1988), after which high rates of immigration from 
many new origins brought a turnaround, from heavy decline to substantial 
growth, between the 1970s and 1980s in the city’s population trends (NYDCP, 
2004).  In fact, since security-based restrictions cut immigration to the US back 
from its 2001 peak, London seems to have caught up with, and possibly even 
overtaken New York in terms of the net inflow, with each gaining some 500 
thousand people from abroad between 2000 and 20057.  This must surely be 
the first time that London has matched that great immigrant city in these 
terms, and concerns are starting to be expressed there that the new 
constraints on immigration of skilled workers may be starting to affect that 
city’s ability to attract skilled talent (McKinsey, 2007, p16). 
 
                                                 
5 Technically, this index is a z score, scaled to produce a mean value of 1.0 across the full set of 
cities, with a standard deviation of 1.0 also. 
6 With some post World War II concessions for displaced persons from Europe.   
7 The London estimate is from ONS and the New York figure from Demographia (2007).  
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2.3 Conclusion 
What the real significance is for London of this population turnaround, and of 
the new migration which triggered it – beyond the simple addition of extra 
numbers to those living in the city – is the focus of the rest of this report.  In 
some ways it might be argued that there is nothing essentially new about the 
influx which London (like New York) is now experiencing.  The city has long 
experience of playing host to cultural elites (or cultural servants of the elite), to 
refugees and would be revolutionaries, to upwardly mobile people seeking 
an introduction to the world of affairs, and to larger numbers looking simply 
for work.  What is novel about the present situation seems principally to be the 
coincidence of each of these kinds of flow, operating on a much larger 
scale, and from more countries of origins than London has ever experienced 
before.  We start our investigation in the next chapter by seeking to chart the 
kinds of flow now coming into London, their scale and the dynamics of their 
change.  
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3 Migrant flows, stocks, composition and 
dynamics  
 
This chapter focuses on the ‘new migration’ into London and the UK over the 
past 20 years, seeking to establish some basic facts about: who has been 
coming to London, in what numbers, and what the margins of uncertainty are 
about this.  It also analyses how and why trends have been evolving over this 
period and what the implications are for longer term population change in 
the city.  
 
3.1 Sources and definitions 
From the outset it must be recognised that there are particular problems in 
pinning down the numbers, characteristics – and thus the impacts – of 
international migrants.  These reflect various factors: 
 
• the heterogeneity of types of move and difficulties in establishing who 
should be counted as a migrant, as distinct from e.g. a visitor; 
• the elusiveness of recent, frequent or weakly integrated migrants as far as 
conventional surveys or administrative records are concerned; 
• the impacts of controls on migrants or their permitted activities on counts 
for those wishing to avoid detection; and 
• the failure of conventional national statistical sources in recording outward 
movements across national boundaries. 
 
In the face of the growing importance of migration (and specifically 
immigration) as a phenomenon, UK official statistics are recognised to have 
major inadequacies.  Indeed the Interdepartmental Task Force (2006) review 
of migration statistics headlines an observation by John Salt, the leading 
academic expert in the UK, that: 
 
‘The reality is …we don’t really have a satisfactory measurement of the 
number of people who are coming to live in the UK’ (p. 15). 
 
While this is clearly true, it is important not to interpret it as meaning that the 
published official estimates are necessarily biased downwards, or that there is 
not a great deal to be learned from them about the role and significance of 
overseas migration.  It should also be recognised that, with the very diverse 
types of trans-national movement which have grown up over the past 20 
years or so, some of the major uncertainties actually involve the question 
‘who should be counted as a migrant’ (for particular purposes), and not 
simply ‘how many immigrants are there’.  In London’s case, as we shall see, 
there are many people from overseas who spend time working and living in 
the city, but not long enough to count as migrants, and many others who are 
counted as migrants but do not stay permanently. 
 
The statistical sources currently used by UK government to estimate inflows 
and outflows of international migrants, and those (notably the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) on which we rely for information about the characteristics of 
London’s migrant population, are discussed in Appendix 1.  There are also 
definitions of the key terms used to refer to various related categories which 
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are sometimes confused.  Our judgement is that, despite the range of 
problems discussed there, the current Total International Migration (TIM) series 
provides a reasonable indicator of the scale of flows and of changes in these 
since the early 1990s, while the LFS offers a reasonably unbiased view of the 
characteristics of those who come to and remain in London.  Due to the 
limitations of available sub-national data, however, we need to start by 
looking quite closely at UK level patterns of migration and how these have 
been evolving in the recent past.  
      
3.2 Migration trends 1991-2005 
After an era of relatively modest, stable and balanced international flows for 
the UK as a whole since the mid-1970s, the period after 1991 (when the TIM 
series start) has been one of strong and rising immigration, with sizeable net 
inflows in every year except 1992 and 1993 (Figure 3.1).  Although on average 
outflows are of a comparable magnitude to inflows (averaging some 300 and 
400 thousand per year respectively over these 14 years), it is in-migration 
which is the main driver of change.  This very largely (around 85%) comprises 
primary immigration by people born outside the UK, whereas a larger part of 
out-migration represents return moves by recent immigrants (with the UK-born 
accounting for just half the outflow).  Thus over the period as a whole, 
international emigration from the UK has tended to grow, alongside 
immigration.   
 
Figure 3.1: International migration flows UK, 1975-2005 
 
 
Source: ONS data presented in ITF (2006). 
Notes: Data for 1975-1991 from the International Passenger Survey (IPS) only; for 1991-2005 on a TIM basis 
(including asylum seekers and status switchers). 
 
Comparing the two halves of this period (the calendar years 1991-97 and 
1998-2005) it can be seen (Table 3.1) that out-migration has grown by about 
one-third as much as in-migration (65 thousand p.a. compared with 194 
thousand) with net-migration increasing by two-thirds as much (129 thousand 
p.a.).  Higher levels of asylum seeking were partly responsible for the 
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increased inflow – up 31 thousand p.a. on average.  This actually reflects 
much higher levels in just 4 years, 1999-2002, when they averaged 88 
thousand compared with 32 thousand in the other 11 years.  (A sharp 
reduction in asylum flows since 2002 presumably partly reflects a tightening of 
controls, but is in the context of reduced applications to all West European 
countries, and a halving of inflows to OECD nations).   
 
Table 3.1: International migrant flows into and out of the UK, 1991-2005 (annual 
averages in 000’s) 
 
 1991-2005 1991-97 1998-
2005 
Change 
between 
sub-
periods 
 
Total in-flows 407 304 498 194 
Total out-flows 298 264 329 65 
Total balance 109 40 169 129 
Asylum seekers in-flow 50 34 65 31 
Asylum seeker out-flow 11 5 15 10 
Irish in-flow 11 16 6 -10 
Irish out-flow 18 18 16 -2 
Other in-flow 346 254 427 173 
Other out-flow 269 241 298 57 
Source: ONS (annual), MN series (Total International Migration estimates). 
Note: The ‘other’ category represents migrants recorded by the IPS and subsequent adjustments (adding 
about 20 thousand p.a. to both inflows and outflows) reflecting recorded switches by individuals between 
visitor and migrant status.   
 
Partly off-setting this factor was a reduced in-flow from Ireland, falling by 75% 
since the mid-1990s (reflecting the marked strengthening of the Republic’s 
economy).  The main factor, however, has been a fairly consistent growth in 
other kinds of immigration from many other origins.  These flows have risen 
steadily from 1995 on, with growth rates of 8-9% p.a., reaching 454 thousand 
in 2003.  There was a step up to 537 thousand in 2004 and 2005, principally 
reflecting the impact of heightened flows from the new (A8) EU accession 
countries in eastern/central Europe from May 20048.  
 
The major origins in terms of the area of last or next country of residence are 
shown in Table 3.2 for the 2005 flows.  For the broad regions which we identify, 
the EU15 (i.e. the 15 countries of western Europe within the EU prior to its last 
expansion) stands out in terms of the combined volume of flows in and out, 
reflecting both its proximity and the free internal movement of labour.  
Relative to the population sizes of the countries involved, however, the flows 
to and from Australia/New Zealand are actually the most remarkable, 
showing the potency of continuing cultural connections.   
 
Within Europe too, it is remarkable that the EU’s new accession countries to 
the east (dominated numerically by Poland) generated almost as large an 
                                                 
8 For 2005, the IPS estimates an inflow to the UK of 70 thousand migrants from these countries, 
and an outflow of 17 thousand (ONS, MN32, 2007). 
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inflow to the UK in 2005 as the vastly larger population of the EU15, though the 
outflows from the UK were very much smaller.  Clearly the combination of the 
large wage differentials relative to the A8 countries, and the lead taken by 
the UK in opening up its borders immediately in 2004 to labour migrants from 
these new accession countries has much to do with this.  In terms of the large 
proportional excess of inflows over outflows, the A8 countries seem, however, 
to fit into a rather simple pattern.  The relatively poor/low wage regions of the 
world generate substantial net inflows to the UK, whereas the richer regions 
are either in balance (in the case of the USA) or attract substantially larger 
outflows from the UK (in the case of the EU15 and Australia/New Zealand).  
 
Table 3.2: Migration flows by international regions of last/next residence, 2005 
 
 Inflow 
(000’s) 
 
Outflow 
(000’s) 
Net balance 
(000’s) 
Indian sub-
continent 
 
86 
 
17 
 
+69 
EU A8 countries 81 18 +63 
African 
Commonwealth 
 
62 
 
20 
 
+41 
Rest of the World 159 102 +58 
USA 25 27 -1 
EU15 95 114 -18 
Australia/New 
Zealand 
57 82 -27 
Total 565 380 185 
    
Rich countries 184 236 -52 
Poor countries 381 144 +237 
Source: ONS (2007) International Migration MN32. 
Notes: 1. These data are on a TIM basis.  2. ‘Rich countries’ include the Old Commonwealth (OCW) (except 
South Africa), the EU15, and the US, while ‘Poor countries’ include all others.  
 
In terms of country of birth, the general pattern is, not surprisingly one of net 
gains by migration of those born abroad and net losses from the UK-born 
population.  The scale of the estimated net outflow of the latter group, 
however, is remarkable, averaging 81 thousand p.a. during 1998-2005, 
alongside average gains of 249 thousand p.a. among the foreign-born.  
Taking the EU15 and the Old Commonwealth (OCW) as an approximation to 
the group of ‘rich countries’, there was an average net inflow of those born in 
this part of the world of 43 thousand per year, against a gain of some 203 
thousand p.a. from the ‘poorer’ rest of the world.  Given that migration by the 
UK-born is very largely to or from other rich countries, we can see that the net 
outflow from the UK to other rich countries equates with there being much 
larger net losses by migration of the UK-born than the net gains to the UK from 
the migration of those born in other affluent countries.   
 
The balance between these groups in UK migration has changed substantially 
since 1991 (see Figure 3.2).  The inflow of those born in other rich countries 
(EU15 and OCW) grew substantially in the early 1990s, as the economy 
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moved out of recession, and then levelled off.  By contrast, the inflow of those 
born in the generally poorer remainder of the world rapidly accelerated after 
1998, increasing by 200 thousand over just 7 years, and reaching 3 times the 
level at which it started out in 1992.  The inflow of the British-born, i.e. earlier 
out-migrants returning home, while experiencing short-term fluctuations  has 
shown no real trend, but the outflow of this group has moved up strongly 
since 1998, when it totalled 125 thousand, to touch 200 thousand in 2004, 
before falling back slightly in 2005.  The pattern of overall changes among all 
emigrants over these years suggests that the shift relates very largely to: 
 
• people intending to stay away for 4 or more years (whereas inflows have 
grown mainly among people expecting short – 1-2 year – or uncertain 
stays); and 
• to people with reasons other than work/study or accompanying/joining 
others, and to women much more than men.  (This group comprises of a 
combination of ‘other reason’ and ‘no reason stated’ in the statistics e.g. 
they would include retirees, people taking extended breaks, individuals 
setting up businesses, and if answers are not considered work related.) 
 
Figure 3.2: UK migration inflows and outflows by birthplace of migrants: UK-
born, other rich countries and poor countries, 1992-2005 (000’s) 
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Source: ONS (annual) MN series. 
Notes: 1. Rich Countries are defined here as the EU15 plus the Old Commonwealth.  2. Data are on a TIM 
basis and expressed in thousands.  
 
There are interesting patterns of correlation among these streams of migrants.  
In the case of migrants born in rich countries, there is a strong positive relation 
between the scale of outflows from the UK and those of inflows in the previous 
year, suggesting that the pro-cyclical fluctuations in the inflows of this group 
 21 
contain a large element of short-term migrants9.  For those born in poor 
countries there is no such relationship – while for those born in the UK, the 
significant (positive) relationship is between their outflow rate, and the inflow 
of migrants from poorer countries 2 years previously10.  
 
This latter correlation suggests the possibility of some kind of displacement or 
reaction process caused by the inflow of poor country migrants stimulating 
higher out-migration11.  Certainly there has been a large increase in 
emigration of the British-born since 1997, in a period when UK economic 
performance has been relatively strong – removing one traditional reason for 
emigration – and when an unusually large proportion of emigrants expected 
to be away for more than 4 years, and gave reasons for going other than a 
specific job, study or joining/accompanying a family member. 
 
3.3 London’s role in UK migration  
Over the period since 1991, the published TIM series suggest that London (with 
just 12% of the national population) was associated with 40% of the inflows, 
30% of the outflows, and absorbed 67% of the net balance of overseas 
immigration.  In the second half of this period, London’s share of the inflow 
appears even higher, though this actually peaked in 1997-2001 – years both 
of high levels of asylum seeking nationally, and of strong employment growth 
in London – when it averaged 44%, against 38% in the years before and since.  
 
As we note in Appendix 1, however, these estimates of London’s share of the 
inflow are now understood to be significantly exaggerated in relation to 
where migrants actually end up.  Combining the sets of revisions proposed for 
the years 1999-2002 and for 2002-5, and making a similar adjustment for 1998, 
a more likely figure for ‘total international migration’ into London over the last 
8 years appears to be approximately 185 thousand p.a. gross and 87 
thousand p.a. net.   
 
At 38% and 51% of the UK totals (for gross and net flows), these still represent 3 
times and 4 times (respectively) London’s expected share on a simple 
population basis.  This disproportion is not new: through the 1970s and 1980s 
London appears to have absorbed about a third of inward migrants to the UK 
(on IPS estimates), with an above average ratio of inflows to outflows.  As the 
total volume of inward movement has gone up and net immigration has 
become the norm nationally, so London’s share seems to have increased. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Regressing the outflow rate on the previous year’s inflow rate for this group yields a coefficient 
of 0.45, with and adjusted R-squared value of 0.75 over the years 1993-2005. 
10 The coefficient on the lagged inflow rate is 0.39, and the adjusted R-squared value 0.889, 
reflecting an extremely significant relationship. 
11 A simple regression of out-migration by British nationals in the years 1994-2004 on foreign-born 
immigration rates 2 years earlier yields an adjusted R-squared value of 0.83 and a regression 
coefficient of 0.28 (rising to 0.50 if the previous year’s unemployment rate is included as a 
control variable.  There is a similar relation for out-migration from the UK by foreigners, in relation 
again to their lagged in-migration rate, but this seems essentially to reflect the incidence of 
return/onward migration (a view supported by the fact that similar relations can be found on a 
more disaggregated level, e.g. for asylum seekers, Irish flows, EU citizens etc.). 
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Figure 3.3: Gross international migration 1985-2005: London versus the rest of 
the UK (RUK), 000’s 
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Source: ONS (annual) MN series.   
Notes: 1. Data are on a TIM basis, covering calendar years and expressed in thousands.  2. RUK is the rest of 
the UK (excluding London). 
 
Inspection of the annual TIM series (Figure 3.3) shows that both London and 
the rest of the UK have had strong upward trends in immigration since the 
mid-1980s, alongside a slower but steady increase in emigration.  The timing 
of periods of strong growth has been rather different, however, with 
immigration into London growing most steeply between 1994 and 2000, then 
levelling off, while in the rest of the UK the upturn came later and rapid 
growth was concentrated in the years 1998-2004. The ratio of inflows to 
outflows has almost always been greater in London than in the rest of the UK. 
London has had consistent net gains from immigration since 1985, whereas 
this only became the norm across the rest of the country in 1998.  Outside 
London, it is also notable that rates of outflow seem to have been much more 
heavily shaped by inflows 1 or 2 years earlier, which may imply more shorter 
term immigration there.  Of the two special factors generating sharp year on 
year fluctuations nationally – asylum seekers and the recent A8 influx – 
London seems to have been more affected by the former, though there are 
major data uncertainties in both cases.   
 
Over the period 1983-97 (during which large scale refugee flows to the UK 
emerged and rose to almost their peak level), London has been estimated to 
have received between 240 and 280 thousand refugees – 85% of a UK total 
estimated at between 282 and 330 thousand12 (Storkey and Bardsley, 1999).  
In the years since 1997, ONS figures for net movements by asylum seekers 
suggest that the UK total should have risen by some 400 thousand.  Dispersal 
policies introduced in 2000 appear to have substantially reduced London’s 
share of these new additions to the refugee population.  Overall this has 
                                                 
12 This 85% estimate originally derives from analysis of a sample of Home Office files for those 
granted asylum or exceptional leave to remain between 1983 and 1991 (Carey-Wood et al., 
1995). 
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averaged about 31%, since although only about 5% of those supported with 
accommodation under the National Asylum Support Scheme live in London, 
the proportion remains at about 73% for those just receiving financial 
assistance (HO, annual).  Over the period 1998-2005 then, it appears likely 
that London will have added a further 180 thousand or so to its refugee 
population (i.e. an average of about 23 thousand per year, though falling to 
perhaps a quarter of that rate in the last couple of years).   
 
In the case of the A8 migrants, who started arriving in the second half of 2004, 
there is only a year and a half of data on which to base judgements.  There is 
also a great deal of uncertainty about the to-ings and fro-ings and length of 
stay of this group (among whom the Poles are numerically dominant).   
 
National statistics indicate that intending migrants (as distinct from working 
visitors) numbered some 52 thousand in 2004 and 80 thousand in 2005.  
Estimates of London’s share in this total vary between 13% based on Worker 
Registration Scheme (WRS) registrations and about 33% on a national 
insurance number (NINO) basis, with an intermediate figure from the Annual 
Population Survey (APS) of 19%.  The point seems to be that Poles in particular 
had been coming to London in increasing numbers since the early 1990s (with 
very much smaller flows to the rest of the country) and continue to come, 
independently of accession and the WRS.  The new (WRS-managed) flows 
have spread workers (most of whom intend staying less than 3 months) much 
more evenly across the country, including rural areas where a sizeable 
minority have taken seasonal jobs in agriculture/food-processing (HO et al., 
2007).   
 
The addition to London’s migrant inflow consequent on allowing immediate 
entry to job-seekers from the A8 countries is probably in the region of 5-10 
thousand p.a., with the likelihood of some additions to the outflows of this 
group reducing the net impact further.  A8 arrivals have thus been another 
factor, along with the recent slowing and dispersal of asylum arrivals 
contributing to London’s reduced share in UK immigration over recent years – 
though in numeric terms it has stabilised, not actually fallen.   
 
In terms of the more specific national origins of recent migrants to London, we 
have pooled data on the most recent year’s arrivals from LFS’ undertaken 
between 1999 and 2006.  The results, presented in Table 3.3, show a broad 
spread of intakes across regions of the world, including particularly Europe 
(East and West), Africa and Asia (both South and East).  The countries 
responsible for the largest inflows were (in order) Australia, India, South Africa, 
Poland, the US and Brazil. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
Table 3.3: Origins of immigrants to London, 1998-2005 
 
Country of origin 
 
Percentage of inward flows 
Western Europe 18% 
    of which France 5% 
Central/Eastern Europe 14% 
    of which Poland 5% 
Australia/New Zealand 9% 
North America 6% 
   of which US 5% 
Caribbean 2% 
Central/South America 5% 
    of which Brazil 3% 
Middle East 4% 
South Asia 12% 
    of which India 6% 
East Asia 10% 
Africa 19% 
    of which South Africa 6% 
Source: LFS’s 1999-2006. 
Note:  Data relates to persons arriving in the year preceding the survey. 
 
3.4 Characteristics of the migrant population to London 
For evidence on the characteristics of London migrants we shall rely on 
estimates from the Annual Employment Survey for 2005-6 (which represents a 
consolidated and extended version of the LFS).  Its principal limitation is that it 
excludes all those living in institutional accommodation, which could include 
many recent asylum seekers, who (for this or other reasons) may be missed.  
As we have seen, these are no longer a large element in the inflow and do 
appear to get covered in large numbers after a delay of 2 or 3 years.   
 
The broad characteristics of the immigrant inflow can be most precisely 
measured in terms of data from a single quarter of this survey on arrivals in the 
most recent year.  From this it is evident that, as with immigrants elsewhere, 
those arriving in London from overseas are a young group, with half aged 
between 20 and 30, and only 5% over 45.  Just 20% were children, and half of 
the adults were neither married nor cohabiting.  Just over half were from 
white ethnic origins, and 20% had non-Christian religious affiliations (half of 
these being Muslim).  
 
For a closer look at the make-up of London’s migrant population we need a 
larger sample, and so will pool all those who respondents who have been in 
the country for less than 3 years, while looking also at the group of more 
established migrants (the foreign-born population resident in the UK for more 
than 3 years).   
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In terms of places of origin, we continue to distinguish between those coming 
from relatively ‘rich’ and relatively ‘poor’ countries13.  Asylum seekers/refugees 
cannot be separately identified from the LFS, but for an indication of  
particular characteristics which may differentiate them from other ‘poor 
country’ migrants, we have distinguished a set of ‘asylum countries’, from 
which asylum seekers represent a large proportion of migrants arriving in the 
UK14.  This will exclude many asylum seekers coming from countries which 
generate large numbers of other kinds of migrant, as well as including the 
smaller proportion of migrants from the ‘asylum countries’ who are not 
themselves refugees.  
 
Finally, though the numbers in the sample are small, we have occasionally 
distinguished migrants from the A8 countries (and/or Poland as much the 
largest of these).  This grouping by areas of origin overlaps with ethnic and 
religious classifications, in the sense that 75% of those from rich countries are 
white, compared with a quarter of those from poor countries; while one-third 
of those from poor countries are Muslim, except amongst the recently arrived, 
where the Muslim proportion is diluted by a similar-sized contingent of (white, 
Christian) A8 migrants. 
 
One key characteristic of migrants coming to London could be expected to 
be their level of education, given the city’s increasing specialization in 
functions requiring graduate level skills.  This is not entirely straightforward to 
assess, given differences in the types of qualification that migrants may have, 
and it is perhaps not surprising that the LFS, which has a particular interest in 
qualifications, assigns the majority of migrants to a miscellaneous group as far 
as ‘highest’ qualification is concerned15.  For one-year migrants, the 2001 
Census provides an alternative, less sensitive measure in terms of 5 levels on 
which most migrants do get classified, which Manacorda et al (2006) show to 
be consistent both with the distribution of ages of completing education, and 
with codes given in other waves of the LFS to some individuals elsewhere 
assigned to the ‘other’ group.  At the national scale, they conclude that 
‘other’ qualifications are more likely to equate to degree standards than to 
minimal level assumed by those grouping ‘other’ with ‘none’.  Overall, they 
indicate that the general level of qualifications among migrants is definitely 
above that of the native labour force, implying that migrants make a 
qualitative as well as quantitative contribution to the UK labour supply.   
 
For London on its own, the 2001 Census (SAR) data show the same contrast 
that Manacorda et al (2006) report for the UK as a whole.  Even though the 
proportion with level 4/5 (degree equivalent) qualifications was much higher 
among the London population (in the 16-74 age range), at 30%, than for the 
rest of England and Wales/the UK, at 18%, it was even higher among the 
recent migrants, at 61% (compared with 45% for migrants elsewhere in the 
                                                 
13 The former group are here defined to include the EU15, the Old Commonwealth, the US, 
Japan and Korea. 
14 The countries placed in this group were Albania, Algeria, Bosnia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq,  
Lebanon, Macedonia, Romania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and  two ‘other 
Yugoslavia’ and ‘other Middle East’ groups.  
15 Manacorda et al. (2006) suggest that this is partly a result of deliberate policy by ONS, not 
simply a result of difficulties in coding individual cases.  
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country).  The proportion with no qualifications (i.e. below level 1) was also 
dramatically lower among migrants to London (just 7% compared with 24% 
among the London population).   
 
It is clear then that there is a particularly high level of selection by 
qualification (and presumably also ability) among those migrating to London, 
given the lower incidence of higher education in many of the countries from 
which migrants are drawn.  What is less clear is, firstly, whether the comparison 
also holds on an age for age basis, given that migrants are more likely to be 
competing against their younger peers than those from earlier generations 
where educational opportunities were more limited and secondly, whether 
there are big differences between migrants coming from relatively rich as 
compared to relatively poor countries. 
 
To address the first of these questions we have focused specifically on 20-30 
year olds, as the core group of migrants.  As far as the Census measure of 
qualifications among one-year migrants is concerned, this does tend to 
narrow the differences, but only to a limited extent.  61% of migrants in this 
age group had high level qualifications, against 36% among their London 
coevals; and 7% had no qualifications, against 13%.  To examine how this 
varies across migrants from different origins, and those who have stayed 
longer in the country, we turn to the APS, using age of completing full-time 
education as the indicator of the level likely to have been achieved.  The 
main results are shown in Table 3.4.   
 
Table 3.4: Age of completing full-time education by origin and length of stay 
in the UK: London residents aged 25-44 
 
 Rich country 
migrant 
 
Asylum origins Other poor 
countries 
Age of 
completing 
education 
In  
UK <3 
years 
In  
UK >3 
years 
In  
UK <3 
years 
In  
UK >3 
years 
In  
UK <3 
years 
In  
UK >3 
years 
UK-born 
<16 1% 5% 9% 11% 1% 8% 5% 
16-19 27% 34% 44% 50% 32% 44% 56% 
20-24 46% 47% 27% 24% 46% 35% 34% 
25+ 24% 14% 13% 11% 19% 11% 4% 
Still in  
education 
3% 1% 7% 3% 3% 2% 1% 
Source: Annual Population Survey (APS) 2005-6. 
Note: The survey sample on which these figures are based included the following numbers of respondents 
for the 6 migrant groups:   Rich country < 3 years 500; Rich country > 3 years 2,000;   Asylum origins <3 years 
200; Asylum origin > 3 years 1,000; Other poor countries < 3 years 800; Other poor countries > 3 years 4,200.  
Approximately half of these were in the age range covered by this table.  In total there were 20,000 UK 
born respondents, of whom about one quarter were in this age range. 
 
In terms of those staying in education until at least 20, who are very likely to 
be graduates, it appears that all groups of migrants have higher proportions 
than the native born, with the possible exception of those from asylum origins 
who have been in the UK for several years.  The most recent group of migrants 
from rich country origins are distinguished by having a quarter of them 
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educated beyond age 24, presumably to postgraduate level.  This suggests 
that the most highly qualified are among those staying in the UK for relatively 
short periods, rather than settling here.   
 
Overall, it seems that migrants coming from rich country backgrounds are 
likely to be better qualified than the average migrant from poorer countries.  
There is, however, a very large overlap between the two distributions, and 
migrants from poorer countries are likely to possess qualifications which are at 
least comparable to those of the UK born within this age group.  Relative to 
the London labour force as a whole (or to the London-born within this age 
group), they will have had significantly more education and higher level 
qualifications.  
 
There are, of course, some questions to be asked about the effective 
equivalence of qualifications obtained in different countries – in absolute 
terms as measures of knowledge attainment but also relative to the 
requirements of UK-based firms, and also in relation to the 
understanding/appreciation of London employers.  In particular, the findings 
of MGI (2005) about the limited suitability of the great majority of university-
educated professionals in low-wage countries for employment in 
multinational businesses may also have some relevance at least to newly 
arrived migrants with similar kinds of qualification.  It certainly should not be 
presumed that any of the major streams of inward migration into London over 
the past 10-20 years have low skills or limited potential, by the standards of 
London’s own workforce.  
 
3.5 The longer term demographic impact of international migration  
to London     
The long-term effects of overseas migration on the London population, 
depends on three main factors.  The first and most basic of these is the extent 
to which migrants actually stay, rather than returning to their home country or 
moving on to another destination.  The second issue involves the extent to 
which immigrants from abroad effectively displace some of the local 
population, thus diluting their impact on population growth within the area of 
migrant settlement.  The third factor involves the impact of migration on 
natural change in an area, specifically through the children born to migrant 
parents.   
 
Return and onward moves 
One very important influence on the dynamics of international migration into 
and out of London is the timing of return or onward migration among those 
‘immigrants’ whose stay in the UK turns out to be temporary.  This further 
movement may have been planned from the outset – when migrants come 
to fulfil a specific assignment, to gain experience, to accumulate capital, or 
simply for the pleasure of travel – or it may be unexpected – with a further 
move stimulated by another opportunity, a development requiring/permitting 
return ‘home’, or dissatisfaction with how the migrant experience has turned 
out (‘failed migration’).  Alternatively, and quite commonly among past 
immigrant groups, expected return moves may fail to materialise, because 
new attachments develop, connections with ‘home’ weaken, or target rates 
of saving prove harder to achieve in practice.   
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In fact, though the preconception about migrants is that they are people 
who intend making a permanent move to a new country, the norm seems to 
be quite different.  Almost half of immigrants (whether from rich or poor 
countries) declare an intention on arrival of coming for 1-2 years, with less 
than a third expecting to stay more than 4 years.  On exit, three-quarters of 
foreign migrants leaving the UK declare stays of between 1 and 4 years.  This 
seems reasonably consistent with the stated intentions of immigrants, except 
that the much lower level of recorded emigration than of immigration by 
foreigners makes it clear that a very large number actually end up staying 
semi-permanently.  
 
Hard data on durations of stay and their variation across migrant groups are 
somewhat elusive (whether at UK scale or for migrants to London) because of 
the limitations of administrative records/official surveys of those leaving the 
country (since such moves are hardly subject to control, while the vast 
majority of those leaving are travellers not emigrants).  Further, in domestic 
surveys, even designedly longitudinal ones, emigrants tend to figure only as 
(one type of) unexplained absence.    
 
The best available source appears to be the Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
(QLFS).  This survey regularly provides estimates of the numbers of (past) 
immigrants by their year of arrival into the UK, with the rate of attrition among 
a particular cohort in successive years (in those age bands with low mortality 
rates) providing a reasonable proxy measure of the likely rate of re-migration 
out of the UK.  This is subject to significant sampling error where migrant 
groups are small (since annual samples are very largely independent16), while 
there is also a significant question – on which,  as we shall see,  the survey itself 
casts some light – about the likelihood of recent immigrants being found and 
responding to the QLFS. 
 
To explore the importance of return moves for particular categories of 
immigrant group, we have taken the cohorts of people who declared arrival 
dates in the years 1986-2006 and tracked the successive estimates of their 
numbers in spring quarters of the QLFS from 1999 to 2006.  As the LFS is not 
supposed to survey recent arrivals, we have taken the number recorded as 
arriving in the preceding calendar year as a baseline estimate of the inflow.  
We have then tracked how numbers in a particular cohort change over 
successive waves of the survey, to estimate probabilities of survival/staying in 
London from the 1st to 2nd year, 2nd to 3rd and so on17.   
 
With the exception of migrants coming from the asylum countries (whose 
recorded numbers increase for the first 3 years), the pattern is one either of no 
significant changes in numbers or of reduction.  We take this as some 
reassurance that, apart from asylum seekers, who are clearly less likely to be 
counted (for both formal and informal reasons) that immigrants are being 
                                                 
16 By design individuals stay in the sample for 5 quarters, so that in comparisons between one 
quarterly survey and that 12 months later, at least 80% of the sample members will have 
changed. 
17 Given the extreme youth of the great bulk of migrants, we have effectively assumed that all 
exits from the sample are by migration (whether out of London, or more likely out of the 
country).   
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covered by the LFS.  Initially we explored this issue on a quite disaggregated 
basis, but the one significant pattern of variation turned out to be between 
the three broad groups already discussed, namely migrants from rich 
countries, from asylum origins and from other poor countries.   
 
In the first case, there seems to be a continuous decline, at about 15% p.a. for 
the first 6 years, and half that rate thereafter.  In the second case, there is a 
window some 5-8 years after arrival in which numbers do appear to reduce 
significantly (by around 20%), but do stabilise from then on.  After 10 years, the 
numbers were down by 80%, implying that this group is on the whole made up 
of temporary migrants to London.  Among the third group, i.e. all others from 
poor countries, we found no significant evidence of a downward trend in 
numbers over the years after arrival, suggesting a very high propensity do 
settle more or less permanently in London18.   
 
This significant difference in the actual pattern of behaviour of migrants (as 
distinct from their originally stated intentions) from poor as against rich origins 
has important implications for the effects of their arrival on the growth and 
composition of the London population.  Basically, it suggests that a constant 
stream of in-migrants from rich countries is likely to cause something like a 
once-for-all increase in the London population (and a once for all effect on its 
diversity), whereas a similar stream from poor countries will produce more or 
less continuous growth (and shifts in population composition).  
 
Displacement 
Over decades a pattern of population decentralisation from core areas of 
the London region followed from increasing aspirations of Londoners to spend 
part of their rising incomes in acquiring access to more space, inside and 
outside their dwellings, whether by finding larger dwellings, reducing their 
household sizes, or finding areas with more external space.  Success in 
achieving lower residential densities in this way inevitably meant a continuous 
tendency for fewer people to live inside the fixed area of Greater London.  
 
  
                                                 
18 An actual tendency for London-based migrants to return home could, in principle, be 
obscured by a drift into London by migrants originally counted elsewhere.  We have no 
evidence of this being a significant factor.   
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Figure 3.4: Trends in domestic versus international net migration Greater 
London, 1981-2005 (000’s) 
Source: Office for National Statistics. 
 
Immigration can change this pattern, by bringing in a population with a 
greater preference for access over space and/or less resources (especially in 
their early years) to afford the densities on which established Londoners have 
settled.  This means that they do not necessarily displace an equivalent 
number of Londoners, but they are still likely to displace some, thus boosting 
the rate of net migration out of London to other parts of (mostly) southern 
England.   
  
Inspection of simple charts of net international and domestic migration 
into/out of London tends to support this picture,  with the scale of net outward 
migration from London to the rest of the UK being more or less doubled in 
recent years, alongside the growth of the positive net balance from 
international migration (see Figure 3.4).  More systematic statistical analysis of 
the pattern of movements across the set of southern regions by Hatton (2006) 
suggests, that the current measure of displacement is in the range 40-50%, 
implying that for each additional 1 thousand international migrants into 
London, we might expect the London population to go up by just 500-60019.  If 
the housing preferences and resources of long-term migrants (particularly 
those from poor countries) converge toward those of the home population, 
we should expect the long-run displacement effect to be significantly higher. 
 
Natural change 
The impact of migration on natural change is primarily through its effect on 
enlarging the size of the child-bearing age groups.  Its scale is a little 
complicated to gauge because births may be spread over a long period 
after migrants’ arrival in London.  In fact, data on the youngest children in 
households with migrant mothers (from the 2005-6 APS) suggests that the 
average delay between arrival and births is 12-13 years.  Hence, many of the 
                                                 
19 This is aside from any question of immigration possibly stimulating out-migration from the UK, 
as the trends that we have discussed in relation to other parts of the country might perhaps 
suggest.  
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children which may be expected to be born to migrant mothers from the 
years of peak inflow since 1998 have yet to arrive.   
 
Currently, among children of all ages in London about 55% appear to have 
UK born mothers; the proportion born abroad rises with age from zero 
amongst the youngest to around 15% at age 15.  Conversely the proportion 
born in the UK to migrant mothers falls from near 45% to about 30%.  If the 
higher migration rates of the last 8 years continue up to the time when these 
recent cohorts have completed their family formation (and recent birth rates 
continue), the likely shares among 15 year olds would be nearer 45% with UK-
born mothers, 15% immigrants, and 40% born to migrant mothers – with a 
cohort entering the working age group about 20% larger than at present.  
 
In other words, over and above the direct contribution of current immigration 
to population growth in London, very important secondary effects are to be 
expected over quite an extended period through births to a larger number of 
women in the child-bearing age groups.  This is already a major explanation 
of how London has managed to shift from being a region of natural decrease 
in population (with deaths exceeding births), to being the one with the 
highest rate of natural increase.  The higher rates of immigration of the years 
since 1998 will further raise this over the next decade and beyond – with 
knock on effects on the growth of the working age population continuing in 
the period beyond that.   
 
3.6 Conclusions 
There are still substantial uncertainties about the scale and character of the 
recent international migration into the UK as a whole, and about the relative 
strength of the various causal factors contributing to it.  Some of this 
uncertainty reflects the fact that the new international mobility is very diverse, 
with a wide range of types of people, with different kinds of skills, coming from 
very many different origins, for periods ranging from a few months to the rest 
of a lifetime.  By convention, all those coming for more than a year (or 
expecting to do so) are identified as ‘migrants’, but this label is not particularly 
meaningful, and consequently generalisations about the effects of ‘migrants’, 
or about the appropriate level of total migration are not likely to be very 
helpful. 
 
Several things are, however, quite clear about migration to London over the 
past twenty years or so. It is large by historic standards, and certainly by 
comparison with the rest of the UK.  It is not purely a London (or UK) 
phenomenon, but London has received several times the share that its own 
population would lead one to expect.  An international upsurge in asylum 
seeking (now abated), and recently boosted numbers of migrants from the 
new EU accession countries have both contributed to the growth, as have a 
couple of boom periods in London employment.  None of these factors have 
been dominant as causes.   
 
London’s foreign-born population has doubled, growing by about 1 million 
over 20 years, with a good likelihood that there will be a foreign-born majority 
inside the Greater London Authority (GLA) area (if not across the wider 
London region) at some stage in the not-so-distant future.  A much wider 
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range of origins for these flows (as compared with those of the 1960s/70s) has 
produced a much more cosmopolitan mix for the London population.  
Immigration has been responsible for turning round London population trends 
from long-term decline to quite solid growth.  It has also substantially 
increased the size of the young working age group, and raised average levels 
of education in the workforce. 
 
In purely demographic terms, a key distinction appears to be that between 
migrants from relatively rich/high wage countries on the one hand and those 
from relatively poor/low wage countries on the other.  This is not because of 
any simple distinction in terms of ‘skill’ or human capital level between them, 
since both include more graduates than does the London workforce as a 
whole.  Rather it is because of very different dynamics in their pattern of 
movements, with most of those from ‘rich country’ origins leaving the UK 
sooner or later, whereas the great majority of those from ‘poor country’ origins 
have tended to stay.  A logical consequence is that net international 
migration will be dominated by the flows from the poorer countries, which are 
primarily responsible for the growth in population and labour supply – both 
directly and via subsequent births to migrant families in London.   
 
Increased net immigration from overseas has been accompanied by an 
increase in the city’s net population losses to other parts of the UK, principally 
to neighbouring regions in the Greater South East.  The pattern of association 
suggests a displacement effect via competition for opportunities in the 
housing (or possibly labour market).  Currently, induced domestic losses 
appear to offset about half the gains from international flows, but if the 
resources and tastes of migrants converge on those of the UK-born, it would 
be possible for displacement to very largely neutralise the effect of 
international migration on growth of population inside the GLA area.  Overall 
the expectation is that migrants should boost the overall performance and 
competitiveness of the London economy, to the potential advantage of all, 
but limitations on any key resources (notably space) will also involve issues of 
competition.   
 
To explore how the substantial qualitative and quantitative changes in the 
London population are likely to impact on the scale and distribution of 
opportunities generated in London, and how this differs between those 
coming from richer versus poorer national origins, we turn now to look first at 
processes in the housing market.  Chapter 5 examines the impacts on the 
labour market/economy and public service provision.   
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4 Accommodating the migrant population – the 
impact on housing markets 
 
The most immediate impact of immigration is on the demand for housing.  
Migrants need housing as soon as they arrive – and, as we have already seen, 
they tend to come disproportionately to London.  Their demand increases 
pressure on the housing market, pushing up prices as compared to other parts 
of the country and helping to generate movement out of the capital.  
Increases in house prices reduce the amount of space that Londoners 
consume, increases problems of access to owner-occupation and puts 
greater pressure on the rental sectors both private and social.  They may also 
reduce people’s capacity to form separate households.  The extent of these 
impacts depends on how responsive supply is to increased demand – as well 
as how responsive households are to higher prices and fewer housing 
opportunities.   
 
In this chapter we try to unpack some of these relationships to assess the net 
effect of immigration on housing in the capital and thereby on the 
attractiveness and competitiveness of London.  It is very much a patchwork, 
mixing well-established quantitative results and more anecdotal evidence.  
We look first at the extent of household immigration and its relative 
importance in determining the additional housing required.  We also look at 
the evidence on differential behaviour of migrant households as compared 
to the local population.  Secondly, we examine the impact on out-migration 
to the rest of the country – and thus on the mix of households that remain in 
the capital.  Thirdly, we examine the tenure that migrant households tend to 
live in, and where.  We then examine evidence with respect to relative house 
prices in London and the extent to which additional demand and therefore, 
pressure on house prices originates from migrants.  Next we examine the 
impact on the rented sector – both, what is happening in the private rented 
accommodation, where early migrants tend to be disproportionately 
located, and what impact immigration has on social housing and social 
mixing.  Finally, we draw conclusions as to the impact of migration on 
London’s housing market and its consequent effect on competitiveness.    
 
4.1 Immigration and projected housing requirements 
The vast majority of data on migration relate to individuals rather than to 
households.  To understand the impact of immigration, however, it is 
important to understand how many households will be added to demand, 
and the extent to which migrant households act in a way similar to those born 
in the UK. 
 
The most detailed evidence on the relationship between in-migration and 
household formation comes from a study based on the 2003 population 
projections and 2001 census based household representative rates (Holmans 
with Whitehead, 2006).  This suggests that the number of households in 
London can be expected to rise by some 36 thousand p.a. over the period to 
2021 and that this accounts for about 17% of the overall increase in England 
during that period.  Thus, London is expected to house a disproportionate 
share of the national increase. 
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Within this total, international migration is seen as accounting for some 26% of 
the national increase but almost 70% of the increase in London (Table 4.1).   
This is partly because London’s population is generally younger and less 
family-based than elsewhere, so the impacts of longevity, aging and family 
break-up are less.  Equally the propensity to form separate households is not 
expected to increase as rapidly in London as elsewhere in part because of 
higher house prices.  
 
Table 4.1: Components of the projected increase in households 2001-21: 
regional analysis, (000’s per year) 
 
 Longevity External 
migration 
Separation  
of couples  
Household 
representative 
rates 
 
Other  
changes 
(a) 
Residual Total 
North 
East 
2 1 3 2 1 -3 6 
North 
West 
7 4 7 6 2 -3 23 
Yorkshire 
and 
Humber 
5 4 5 4 1 -1 18 
East 
Midlands 
4 2 5 4 1 4 20 
West 
Midlands 
5 4 5 5 2 -2 19 
East of 
England 
5 4 6 5 2 6 28 
London 6 25 6 6 2 -9 36 
South 
East 
8 8 9 7 2 2 36 
South 
West 
6 3 6 5 1 5 26 
England 48 55 52 44 14 0 213 
Source: Holmans with Whitehead (2006). 
Note: (a) comprises ‘other changes in total and age structure’ (of the population) and ‘other interaction 
effects’. 
 
Since these estimates were made, the 2004 based population projections 
have been published.  These suggest a further expansion which is expected 
to increase the number of additional households nationally to perhaps 223 
thousand p.a.  Much of this further expansion can be attributed to migration 
and therefore, again places a disproportionate increase in London – resulting 
in a new estimate of 36 thousand additional households p.a. each year to 
2026 (CLG, 2007).  Since these projections were published, the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) has published ‘indicative estimates’, revising its 
migration estimates for London downwards, and within London particularly for 
Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea and Camden (see Appendix 1).  These 
suggest that the net numbers of migrants remaining in London might have 
been overestimated by as much as 60 thousand people since 2001, more 
than offsetting any increase in household numbers arising from the changed 
population projections.  Very roughly this would reduce the average annual 
household migration figure in London by perhaps 6-7 thousand bringing 
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London’s share of expansion far nearer to the national average.  This revision 
has been challenged especially by the boroughs with the greatest downward 
adjustments.  Holmans’ examination of how many households have actually 
formed since 2001 suggests that the actual increase in household numbers 
has been well below that projected (Holmans, 2007).  Assessing this very 
different evidence, a best guess would be that the number of households in 
London will continue to rise by at least 30 thousand p.a. and that around two-
thirds of this increase will be related to net immigration.   
 
The second important question is whether migrants and natives form similar 
numbers of households out of a given population. The evidence here 
appears to be straightforward.  New migrants generally have lower 
household representation rates than established households, particularly as 
compared to those born in the UK.   
 
Table 4.2 shows that the household reference person ratios among persons 
that entered the UK within the previous 5 years, are lower than among those 
that entered the UK between 10 and 20 years or more previously, or 20 years 
or more previously.  Among those that entered the UK 20 years or more 
previously, the household reference person ratios were very similar to those of 
the UK-born population.  The picture is therefore, one of household formation 
rates among inward migrants being initially lower than for the UK-born 
population, but converging over time.   
 
Table 4.2: Ratios of household reference persons to total private household 
population: England 2002 to 2005 (%) 
 
 Age (yrs) 
 16-
24 
 
25-
29 
30-
44 
45-
64 
65 and 
over 
Born outside UK      
 Entered less than 5 years ago 23.8 37.9 49.1 57.8 29.4 
 Entered UK 5 years but less than 10 
 years ago 
19.6 43.3 52.9 57.9 43.6 
 Entered UK 10 years but less than 20  
 years ago 
10.5 45.9 55.6 60.5 50.5 
 Entered UK 20 years or more ago 23.5 41.4 58.1 60.0 69.8 
Born in the UK 13.7 45.9 57.3 59.1 70.5 
Whole private household population  13.7 43.5 56.3 59.0 70.1 
Source: Holmans with Whitehead (2006). 
 
These data cannot presently be replicated at the regional level.  There are, 
however, certain clear implications for London.  In the country as a whole 
over half of those born outside the UK have been in the country for more than 
20 years and the proportion entering in the last five years is only 15%.  The 
proportion entering less than five years ago is far higher in London and the 
impact on the demand for separate housing will therefore be lower.  Of 
course if migrants remain in the country, their demand to live separately will 
rise towards the levels of those born in the UK.  As a result migration in a given 
year continues to add to the pressure on demand for additional homes for 
 36 
many years to come.  What matters in the short- to medium-term is that 
migrants will demand less housing than equivalent numbers of non-migrants.   
 
Finally, we have already noted that those from richer countries who generally 
have higher incomes and higher demands are less likely to stay for longer 
periods.  Hence, the conclusion that migrants will require less housing than the 
established population appears quite robust. 
 
4.2 The impact of immigration on movement out of London 
The next relevant question is: as immigrants come into London, how many 
additional households decide to leave the capital for other parts of the 
country.  London has long exported more people to other areas (especially in 
neighbouring region) than it has received in from these areas – even when 
there has been no net immigration from abroad.  These net losses to other 
parts of the UK have, however, increased alongside the growing net 
immigration from abroad.  By no means, however, is all of the 
current movement out of London caused by international immigration.  
Indeed, the evidence discussed in Chapter 3 suggests that an additional 
person entering the capital from overseas leads to around 0.4 or 0.5 of a 
person leaving for the rest of the country.  The other fraction (0.5 or 0.6) adds 
to pressure on housing in the capital and results in higher prices, some 
additional  supply of housing, reduced vacancies, more sharing and  higher 
density living. 
   
Current targets for additional new homes in London run at around 23,000 units 
p.a., although output is still running at a little below 20,000 (GLA, 2004 and 
2006).  The Mayor intends to try to raise the target to around 30,000 p.a. over 
the next few years – but even this will still be below the expansion of 
households.  This implies that pressure on the existing stock will increase 
consistently over the next few years.  To a significant extent this is an outcome 
of the extent to which net international immigration is not fully offset by 
leakages into the rest of the country. 
 
A rather different question is what happens to the social and income mix of 
those seeking housing in London as a result of inward and outward 
movement from the capital.  New research by a group from the University of 
Newcastle (Champion et al, 2007) looks at the impact of mobility by 
examining one-year movers in the 2001 Census.  The research shows  that 
though overall London lost people through migration to the rest of the 
country, there was actually a net inward movement of people from higher 
managerial and professional groups, while the net outflows were of lower 
skilled (and less affluent) workers.  It also showed that these higher qualified 
groups came from outside the London city region, while the out-migrants 
went usually to nearby locations within the South East.    
 
The main message in terms of the housing market is that increased 
international migration is not stopping large numbers of better trained people 
coming to London from elsewhere in the country – although as a result 
commuting distances may be increasing.  Equally it is relatively lower skilled 
workers who are shown to be leaving London, in part presumably because of 
higher house prices and more difficult access to housing.  What cannot 
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readily be measured at present is how many of those who leave the capital 
were themselves international immigrants. 
 
In interpreting these findings it is important to recognise that net figures can 
give a distorted picture of the impact of particular groups of households on 
overall demand.  If, for instance, one looks only at net migration in and out of 
London it is indigenous growth – births over deaths or household formation 
from the established population – that dominates change.  If on the other 
hand one looks at the gross flows, it is clearly net international migration that 
generates additional housing need in London. 
 
A second issue which requires further analysis is the changing pattern of 
household composition.  In particular households that leave London for the 
rest of the country are more likely to be families, while those entering the 
capital are more likely, at least initially, to be single person households.  Over 
time, however, they form families and have children (indeed, as we have 
seen, a majority of children in London in the future are likely to be the children 
of immigrants).  They then require larger accommodation – simply because 
they are young when they come and follow normal demographic patterns 
once they are here.  To understand fully the number of units and the size of 
these units that will be required, we need far better information on who 
returns to their own countries and when and who moves into the suburbs and 
out of London.  At the moment we can only say that initially migrant 
households will be smaller than the average for the capital. 
 
4.3 Migration and tenure 
The main sources of evidence on the tenure of migrants are the Census and 
the LFS (now integrated in the APS).  The main problem is that the LFS/APS 
provides very little housing information except tenure, while the Census 
provides more detail but only for the specific group of one-year movers.  Also 
the data is best analysed by individual rather than by household.  Even so it 
gives a reasonable picture of both initial tenure and how the tenure mix 
changes with time in the country.  
 
Table 4.3 provides some detail on the tenure of migrants by four main groups, 
split between new migrants (less than three years in the country) and more 
established migrants (those who have been here for more than 3 years).   
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Table 4.3: Tenure mix of London residents by migration, origin and time in the 
UK 
 
 Rich 
countries 
 
Asylum 
countries 
Other poor 
countries 
UK 
born 
Total 
population 
 < 3 
years 
> 3 
years 
< 3 
years 
> 3 
years 
< 3 
years 
> 3 
years 
  
Owned 
outright 
1% 24% 2% 6% 3% 16% 21% 19% 
Owned 
with a 
mortgage 
13% 32% 6% 23% 11% 32% 43% 38% 
Social 
rented  
 
6% 
 
21% 
 
35% 
 
46% 
 
21% 
 
37% 
 
26% 
 
27% 
Private 
furnished 
64% 15% 48% 16% 56% 8% 7% 8% 
Private 
unfurnished 
16% 8% 8% 8% 9% 5% 4% 6% 
Source: Annual Population Survey (APS), 2005-6. 
Note: For information on sample sizes see Table 3.4. 
 
New migrants can in principle be divided into those who are joining others 
already in the country – in which case the immediate tenure will depend on 
their hosts rather than their own financial circumstances; and those who 
require housing on entry.  These two groups cannot be separated within the 
survey – but it is likely that many of those in owner-occupation and social 
rented housing will fit into the category of joining others.  
 
An important distinction is between asylum seekers who have some rights to 
accommodation and in-migrants entering mainly for work or education 
purposes who must find their own accommodation (sometimes with the help 
of their employer).  Asylum seekers who are defined as destitute used to be 
accommodated by the local authority in London (at the level of 50 thousand 
in 2000).  Now, however, they are accommodated outside London by the 
National Asylum Support Service (NASS).  The impact of asylum seekers on 
London’s housing position therefore depends on how many do not seek 
accommodation support but manage to house themselves, or who end up 
coming back to London after the asylum decision.  Overall asylum requests 
are decreasing and London’s role in accommodating such households has 
also been significantly reduced.   
 
The figures in the APS are for those from asylum seeking countries not 
necessarily for asylum seekers as such.  They suggest that nearly half of those 
from asylum seeking countries are accommodated in the private rented 
sector, and that very few are able to achieve owner-occupation.  Perhaps 
most importantly, given the increasing constraints on access, even new 
entrants from this group of countries are disproportionately likely to be in the 
social rented sector – either because they join established social tenant 
households or because they become eligible due to their own poor housing 
conditions.  
 39 
Entry into the social sector in London for new migrants is generally, extremely 
difficult.  The vast majority of those who are not asylum seekers would not be 
defined as in priority need and therefore would be unlikely to obtain social 
rented housing.  Even if they are classified as homeless they may be placed in 
temporary accommodation outside the capital. 
 
The number of social sector lettings has been falling rapidly over the last 
decade: with one-third going to transfers; one-third to homeless households; 
and only one-third to those not in priority need.  Thus, initially migrants who are 
not homeless would have very little chance of obtaining social housing.  
Later, family households would be able to gain access through the 
homelessness and waiting list channels.  
 
The position with respect to A8 migrants appears to be slightly different.  They 
currently account for a tiny although growing proportion of entrants into the 
social sector.  Those gaining access are normally in employment and usually 
not in receipt of housing benefit.   
 
The majority of households who enter London to take up job opportunities go 
first into private rented accommodation.  Over 20% of those in the sector in 
London are new households, including migrants. 38% have been in that 
accommodation for less than one year and almost 70% for less than two 
years.  Among migrants 80% of those from rich countries and two-thirds of 
those from poor countries who have been here for less than three years are in 
the private rented sector.  It is the most important tenure for mobile 
households and thus for new international migrants.  When employers assist 
with accommodation for migrant households, this too, will normally be in the 
private rented sector.  Private renting is also a tenure for those not able to 
afford entry to owner-occupation – again more likely to be true for new 
migrants than for other households.  Of course there are new migrant 
households who will simply be competing in the owner-occupied sector – but 
estimates of these are inflated because they include those who go to live with 
established households who are owner-occupiers. 
 
Over time the evidence from the LFS suggests that the tenure of migrant 
households tends towards that for the population as a whole – with some 
cultural and ethnic differences.  Overall ethnic minorities (by no means all of 
whom are migrants) are overrepresented in the social sector – although not 
once are incomes and household characteristics taken into account.  Ethnic 
minorities also account for some 40% of homeless households in London – 
again reflecting household composition, incomes and the higher chance of 
becoming unemployed.  Some ethnic groups, notably from South Asia, are 
more likely to be in owner-occupation.  When this is the case they are more 
likely to be in areas with particularly high proportions of ethnic minorities.  
Equally it is well-known but not well documented that some proportion of 
migrants purchase accommodation which they then let to newcomers from 
their own countries. 
 
Overall therefore, the picture is very similar to that for household formation: 
migrants start in the tenure where they can gain easy access and which 
allows some mobility.  Over time they behave more and more like the 
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established population.  Again what matters from the point of view of 
pressure on the housing market is how many migrant households stay on in 
the capital over long periods of time – and whether there is a correlation 
between incomes and how long people stay.  If better off households stay 
shorter periods then their demands will have less impact on the overall system.  
If those on lower incomes become eligible for social housing, this will have an 
increasing impact on the need to provide additional housing in what is 
already a very pressured system.  The most immediate impacts, however, 
depend upon how the private rented sector responds to increased demands 
from migrants of all income ranges. 
 
4.4 The effect of immigration on London house prices  
In terms of simple averages, London house prices have been rising 
significantly faster than the rest of the country (Table 4.4).  In 1994, which was 
near the bottom of cycle, London’s house prices, while significantly higher 
than elsewhere in the country except the South East, were only 75% higher 
than in the North – the region with the lowest prices.  By 2004 the ratio had 
increased to over 2.5 times.  This suggests very different pressures at work in 
London than elsewhere in the country. 
 
Table 4.4: Relative house prices across regions, 1994-2004 (North = 100) 
 
Region 
 
1994 1999 2003 2004 
East Anglia 119 130 167 152 
East Midlands 110 113 136 129 
Greater London 174 237 287 257 
North 100 100 100 100 
North West 114 106 112 108 
South East 161 182 228 200 
South West 129 136 193 175 
Wales 106 102 112 113 
West Midlands 118 123 145 135 
Yorkshire and Humberside 108 104 114 111 
Source: Council for Mortgage Lenders, Housing Finance, Table 9. 
 
Using mix-adjusted house prices (Figure 4.1) the absolute increases in London 
are clearly shown to be rising rapidly but the proportional difference has in 
fact been declining.  This suggests that the make-up of the transactions, in 
particular the size of dwellings has been changing over time.  It is important to 
note therefore that ‘headline’ figures may overstate differentials. 
 
One reason for the headlines is the emphasis given to the very top end of the 
market.  Looking at the prices of prime private development for comparable 
properties in major cities, Knight Frank suggests that London has the dubious 
distinction of having the most expensive houses in 2007, at around £2,300 per 
sq ft (with 1 Hyde Park the highest example at £4,000 per sq ft).  This survey 
also suggests that over the last ten years prices in prime London locations 
have risen by 230%, as opposed to 185% for the UK average.  This differential 
between major cities and national figures is replicated in other major cities 
such as New York, Dublin and Sydney – with differential price increases in 
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cities such as Moscow, Mumbai and Delhi even greater than in London 
(Knight Frank, 2007).  Commentators on the London market agree that the 
demand is driven by money from overseas – for instance it is thought that 
more than 50% of houses in London sold for over £2m went to overseas buyers 
(Savills, 2007).  This demand, however, does not generally come from 
immigrants in the traditional sense of the term.  Rather they are international 
investors who may be visitors rather than migrants or simply companies 
looking for ‘trophy homes’ – which are inherently in short supply in a rising 
market.  The market is investment rather than person driven.  
 
Figure 4.1: Mix-adjusted house prices, 1999-2006 
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Source: DCLG Table 507. 
 
Across the market overall, Buy-to-Let demand has grown enormously since 
these mortgages were introduced in 1999.  Buy-to-Let now accounts for 
around 10% of all new mortgages in 2006 (CML., 2007).  Research for the GLA 
suggests that up to 70% of all new completions in the London region went to 
investors, of whom the vast majority are in the Buy-to-Let market (HoC, 
CLGSC, 2007; London Development Research Ltd, 2007).  Clearly migrant 
demand is important in providing tenant demand for these properties.  
Equally some of the investors will themselves be migrants, perhaps providing 
for the next wave of entrants.  There is no evidence, however, that new 
migrants are disproportionately involved in this market – indeed rather the 
opposite, as the market is seen to depend heavily on local knowledge and 
credit scoring.  
 
More generally house prices rise because of increases not only in the numbers 
of households but also because of rising incomes and expectations about 
future house price rises, as well as alternative investment opportunities.  
Migrants, as we have shown, are a large part of household growth and their 
demand to live separately increases over time.  On the other hand, they 
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generally have lower incomes at least initially.  Moreover, especially if they 
remain as tenants, their income elasticity of demand for housing is lower than 
for established households.  Therefore their direct effect on house prices is 
likely to be less than established households. 
 
4.5 Migration and private rents 
In the short-run the largest impact of increased immigration is clearly on the 
private rented sector – with migrants from all types of country heavily 
concentrated in that sector during their first 3 years in the country (Table 4.3).  
Moreover, except for those from poor countries this concentration continues, 
if to a lesser extent.  Increased net migration therefore, has a significant effect 
on demand and one would expect that to show up in higher rents.   
 
The evidence on both average rents and on rents at the bottom end of the 
market, as determined for Housing Benefit purposes (Figure 4.2) suggests, 
however, that private rents have stabilized, even in money terms, over the 
period since 2000 (Wilcox, S. and Williams, P., 2007).  This implies that supply 
has expanded rapidly enough to hold rents down.  This in turn may suggest 
that migration could be providing the impetus for the private rented sector to 
expand rather than working in the other direction to exclude established 
households and force higher rents.  Changes in relativities at borough level 
also suggest that it has proved possible to expand supply especially in the 
East and South East of the capital.  It should be remembered, however, that 
these figures are not controlled for size and quality, both of which may well 
have declined as a result of increased pressure. 
 
Figure 4.2: Rents and user costs of housing, London 1996–2005 
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Source: Dataspring. 
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4.6 Migration and the social rented sector 
Table 4.3 has already shown that new entrants, except for those from asylum 
countries, are disproportionately under-represented in the social sector; while 
the position of those returning to the UK are fairly similar to established UK 
households.  The chances of being in the social sector for those from asylum 
and poor countries who have been here for more than 3 years are, however, 
far higher than for the indigenous population.  This particularly reflects both 
their lower incomes and their initially poor housing conditions. 
 
The best source of information about the impact of in-migration on the need 
for additional social housing is provided by the GLA’s (2004) Housing 
Requirements Study.  This estimated need over the next 10 years on the basis 
of homelessness, mismatch between dwellings and households, affordability 
and social requirements.  It examined the combined effect of net immigration 
and the net export of households to the rest of the country – and the resultant 
change in mix of households.  It suggested that, among those entering from 
abroad around 25% of households would need social housing as compared 
to 20% of those from the rest of the country.  It also shows that, on strong 
assumptions about reallocation of established households, net in-migration 
from abroad could account for as much as 70% of the additional housing 
required.  This is in part because those who leave the country tend to go from 
the private rented sector, while those who are housed in the social sector 
tend to remain.   
 
The Requirements Study also suggested that two-thirds of these requirements 
would be for one bedroom dwellings, athough 25% would need at least 3 
bedrooms.  It is this second group who are likely to be in the greatest priority 
need and therefore require more immediate assistance.  There must be 
concerns about the estimates of dwelling size required, given the evidence 
on the numbers of children in London who are expected to be born to 
migrant mothers over the next decade.  This would point, other things being 
equal, to a larger proportion of the need being concentrated in larger units.  
It also suggests that there is likely to be increased overcrowding in both the 
private rented and social sectors. 
 
A final issue here is that of ethnicity.  The numbers of ethnic minority 
households in London reflect past migration, although in some cases this 
could have occurred several generations ago.  Minority populations are 
concentrated in outer areas of London and are more spatially concentrated 
when they live in the private rented sector.  Those who live in the social sector 
or share with others live in the most deprived areas.  Income poverty is 
concentrated among Bangladeshi, Pakistani and black African households, 
with 70% of those in income poverty in inner London coming from ethnic 
minorities.  Overall therefore, it is hardly surprising that these groups are 
disproportionately found in the social sector (Bailey and Livingstone, 2007). 
 
Competition for social housing is seen as one of the most important areas of 
tension between established populations and those coming into the local 
area – who may come from another part of London or the UK as well as from 
abroad.  As such it is seen as an important source of tension impacting 
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negatively on social cohesion (Travers et al, 2007; Hudson et al, 2007; Markova 
and Black, 2007).   
 
4.7 Bringing the story together  
London without international migration might well look far more like some 
northern cities, with continuing out-migration and suburbanisation of more 
mature and better off households and declining populations and growing 
vacancies in central areas.  Instead large scale in-migration has resulted in 
greater utilisation of the existing stock and is associated with the expansion of 
private renting.  It has also been accompanied by some displacement of 
other households to areas outside the capital, transferring part of the 
additional demand to these areas.  As a result, the impact on the established 
London population has been considerably less negative than might have 
been expected. 
 
The initial impact of a migrant household is almost certainly less than that of 
an established household or one moving from the rest of the country.  It is also 
clear that, to the extent that they become private tenants, supply has been 
able to adjust so rents have not risen.  Other problems such as overcrowding 
and increasing numbers of unlicensed Houses in Multiple Occupation have, 
however, almost certainly increased, while space standards may have 
declined – at least at the bottom end of the market where migrants tend to 
be concentrated. 
 
In the owner occupied sector, net in-migration, not offset by out-migration to 
the rest of the country, increases demand and house prices – but initially at 
least by less than their numbers would suggest because of lower income 
elasticities.  There may in addition be secondary effects through increased 
investment demand for housing both through Buy-to-Let, and international 
company and individual demand.  At least at the higher end of the market 
this effect is almost certainly more important than that of migration as such.  
 
The longer term effect of migration on the housing market depends on the 
proportions of each group of migrants who settle in London and so increase 
demand more in line with established households.  The evidence suggests 
that it is households from poorer countries and asylum countries that who are 
more likely to stay.  The better off households are more likely to return to their 
own countries. 
 
The most negative effect of in-migration is its impact on social housing 
requirements.  Many lower-income migrants undoubtedly have housing 
needs that they are unable to meet in the private market and therefore, 
compete for scarce social housing.  Moreover once they gain entry into 
social housing they appear more likely to stay in the country and the capital.  
This is the largest identifiable cost of in-migration. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
Migrants increase the numbers of households looking for accommodation in 
the capital.  Their initial impact on demand, however, is lower than among 
native households with similar attributes.  Migrants are also initially far more 
likely to be in the private rented sector than indigenous households.  
 
The net impact of in-migration into London is partially offset by out-migration 
of other households to the rest of the country.  The impact on demand for 
housing in London is therefore much less than might at first be assumed.  Over 
time, however, the housing demands of migrants become more similar to 
indigenous households and overall demand is therefore further increased.    
 
The increase in demand for housing generated by immigrants increases both 
house prices and the incentive to increase supply.  Supply, however, is 
relatively inelastic – so it is the impact on prices which dominates.  Private 
renting on the other hand has been able to expand, so that rents have been 
rising much more slowly than house prices.   
 
Migrants from asylum seeking and poor countries tend to have larger impacts 
on the need for social housing.  This has significant implications for policy and 
also has the potential for increasing social tensions because of competition 
for scarce housing resources.  Poor migrants in the private rented sector also 
tend to be quite heavily concentrated in particular areas with negative 
impacts on social inclusion and cohesion.  The latest report by the 
Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007) suggests that the rate of in-
migration has led to increased tensions in some areas and states that 
‘diversity can have a negative impact, but only in particular circumstances’.  
It cited research finding three-quarters of respondents preferred living in 
ethnically-mixed neighbourhoods.   
 
More generally the structural change in in-migration is part of broader 
globalisation which includes increased demands to invest in housing across 
the world, as housing becomes an element in overall asset portfolios.  Much 
of the increased demand for housing in London comes from this investment 
demand rather than specifically from in-migration.     
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5 Impacts on the labour market and 
competitiveness in London 
 
The second of the main classes of effect expected from immigration is on the 
performance of London’s productive economy.  Here, there are four main 
types of positive effect which have been hypothesised: 
 
• Provision of a more elastic labour supply, at or below current going rates for 
a job-type, enabling the city (and the national economy) to exploit more 
fully the potential offered by its established competitive strengths in 
activities where further growth could raise productivity, export 
performance and income levels; 
 
• Relieving bottlenecks to development by bringing in specific types of 
labour which are in short supply, whether these involve: 
•  more highly skilled positions, where domestic supply is lacking, or very 
specialist jobs simply need a wider pool of talent;  or 
• lower level jobs which have been effectively rejected by domestic 
workers, where importation of replacement labour could allow 
upward mobility among the home population; 
 
• Facilitating trade relations with migrants’ home countries, through 
exploitation of their language skills, market awareness, networks and social 
capital; and 
 
• Benefits from cultural diversity, either through: 
• contributing to supply in London of ‘exotic’ products and services, 
raising the quality of life for residents and increasing the city’s 
attraction to tourists and groups of ‘talented’ workers with 
sophisticated tastes; or  
• more generally through stimulating product or process innovation 
where synergies can flow from inputs of a greater variety of skills and 
perspectives – and the enterprise traditionally associated with 
immigrant families. 
 
On the other side of the picture, three kinds of possible negative effect have 
been suggested: 
 
• Blunting the incentives to raising labour productivity (and competitiveness) 
through temporarily cheapening the cost of labour for activities where 
changes in production method or location (to somewhere outside London) 
are really required; 
 
• Redistributing income toward already advantaged groups (whether 
owners of capital or workers in more skilled occupations) at the expense of 
those in more marginal positions, whose earnings levels and prospects of 
employment are eroded through competition with groups of immigrant 
workers who have lower expectations and less protection; and/or  
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• Possible lowering of trust levels, co-operativeness and social capital among 
a more heterogeneous business community/workforce (as has been 
claimed to be the case for residential communities20).  
 
On some of these issues, evidence is at present extremely limited, 
internationally as well as in relation to London specifically.  There is some very 
interesting recent work, notably by Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006) – which 
we discuss below – suggesting that the overall balance of these effects is 
positive for cities involved, particularly in terms of the relation between 
productivity/competitiveness and the cultural diversity of the local workforce.  
In general, however, it has proved much easier to examine effects on labour 
market outcomes than implications for other kinds of income, or for 
productivity and competitiveness.  Even in relation to the labour market, 
however, it must be said that a body of rather sophisticated research has not 
led to very clear-cut conclusions about the balance of effects.   
 
In this chapter we shall therefore start off with, and give most of our attention 
to, what is known about the role and effects of the new immigrant flows in 
relation to the London labour market, returning more briefly at the end to 
other kinds of evidence relevant to the questions about impacts on 
productivity and competitiveness. 
 
5.1 The role of immigrants in the London labour market 
The two kinds of argument just referred to about the contribution of 
immigration to a regional labour market – as a more elastic/cheaper source 
of labour supply, and as a remedy for bottlenecks caused by specific gaps in 
the locally available supply – relate to two rather different ways of thinking 
about the role of immigrants in the labour market.   
 
The first of these is basically quantitative, viewing labour migrants as simply an 
addition to the labour pool (‘another pair of hands’), whose effectiveness is 
dependent upon an absence of barriers to their social and economic 
integration.  The other is more qualitative, seeing migrants as representing 
distinct sources of labour, capable of filling specific slots in the labour market 
and being treated differently from indigenous workers, so long as there are 
barriers to their full integration in the mainstream labour market. 
 
These two understandings were both evident in discussion about the 
organised forms of labour importation practised by West European 
economies in the 1950s and 1960s.  On the one hand, arguments were 
advanced that a more elastic labour supply allowed faster economic growth 
without inflation.  On the other hand, there was a clear understanding that 
immigrants were ‘replacement labour’, taking over less attractive and 
remunerative jobs from indigenous workers who would move on up the 
occupational ladder.  In relation to the new migration the picture is greatly 
complicated by a much more heterogeneous set of flows, both into and out 
of London, but both perspectives still have insights to offer. 
 
                                                 
20 Notably by Robert Putnam on the basis of analyses across US urban areas (see Lloyd, 2006).    
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According to the 2005-6 wave of the APS21, 33% of the employed residents of 
London are either immigrants or working visitors22.  Four-fifths of them (27%) 
were established migrants, while the other fifth (7%) had been in the country 
for less than 3 years, with half or so of them likely to be moving on in the next 
few years.   
 
In just two sectors of activity – hotels/restaurants and domestic services – 
immigrants accounted for the larger part of the London workforce, with 
foreign-born residents filling around 60% of the jobs (Table 5.1).  These 
stereotypical immigrant jobs, however, represent only a small proportion of 
those occupied by overseas migrants to London – some 100 thousand out of 
a total of about 1.1 million overall.  The group for whom catering jobs in 
particular are most important are the recent (up to 3 year) arrivals from poor 
countries, for whom they can represent a port of entry into the labour market 
– but even for these, they provide less than 20% of jobs.   
 
A special case is that of the recent inflow from A8 countries, where a majority 
of those working in London appear to be either in the construction industry 
(accounting for a quarter, four times the share among other recent migrants), 
hotels/restaurants or domestic service (also with a much larger share than for 
other recent migrants).   
 
Table 5.1: Migrant employment in London 2005/06 by sector, (000’s) 
 
Sector Migrant employment 
(000’s) 
 
Migrant share of 
employment 
 <3 years  
in UK 
3 years+  
in UK 
<3 years  
in UK 
3 years+  
in UK 
Manufacturing 11 60 5% 25% 
Construction 19 47 9% 21% 
Transport and 
Distribution 
37 212 5% 
31% 
Hotels and Catering 25 63 17% 42% 
Financial services 15 57 7% 25% 
Business services 36 160 6% 26% 
Administration, 
Education 
18 129 3% 
23% 
Health 24 131 6% 33% 
Other services 20 68 7% 22% 
Total 190 525 5% 24% 
Source: Annual Population Survey (APS). 
Note: For information on sample sizes see Table 3.4. 
 
At the other extreme, in terms of relative insensitivity (and closure) to migrants 
are paper/printing/publishing, energy production, public administration, 
                                                 
21 This ‘new’ survey represents a consolidation/extension of the established Quarterly Labour 
Force Surveys, with a substantially enlarged response base, of some 365 thousand individuals 
nationally, including 29 thousand in London.  
22 Though the LFS is not supposed to cover people who have been in the UK for less than 6 
months, so the majority of working visitors (staying for up to 12 months) will actually be omitted. 
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education, and recreational/cultural services, where typically the foreign 
born occupy just 20% of jobs.  Some parts of financial and business services 
also seem to fall into this category23 although others clearly do not.  Across 
Central London, about 25% of jobs in financial and business services are filled 
by foreign-born workers, while the core financial intermediation activities 
have a stronger representation at least of migrants from other rich countries 
(both short- and long-term residents), who occupy about 16% of the jobs.  
Computer related activities are the other area of business services where 
migrants from these countries seem to play an important role, though in this 
case it is just the recent/short-term migrants who are substantially over-
represented.  Overall, financial and business services seem to account for a 
third of the London jobs occupied by migrants from rich countries, compared 
with one-sixth for those from poor countries.  The more general point to put 
alongside this contrast, however, is that virtually all sectors of the London 
economy have become substantial employers of migrant labour, for one 
reason or another.  
 
5.2 Employment status, occupations and earnings of migrants in 
London 
The fact that recent waves of migrants are quite widely spread across the 
London labour market, rather than being concentrated in a few stereotypical 
‘migrant jobs’ does not necessarily imply that all of them have been fully 
integrated or that their potential is being fully used.  Part of the reason for their 
broad diffusion across sectors of employment is simply that the migrants of the 
last 20 years are a very heterogeneous collection of people, with differing 
kinds of potential, and with great variations in the kind of barriers or 
constraints that they may face.   
 
To get a bit closer to these, we need to look firstly at evidence on rates of 
achieved employment among different groups, at earnings levels, and at the 
positions in the occupational hierarchy where they get inserted or to which 
they progress.  Then, we should look at more qualitative kinds of evidence on 
how the London labour market treats different kinds of migrant group, though 
available materials of this kind are more limited. 
 
A starting point is provided by data from the APS for 2005-6, showing the 
employment status of migrants and others in the 25-44 age group.  This covers 
most migrants, while excluding most of those (in the early 20s) who may have 
come to London simply to study.  The statuses distinguished in Table 5.2 
include those who are actually in work (whether as employees or self-
employed) and three groups of non-workers self-identified via 
attitudinal/behavioural questions in the LFS/APS: those of active work-seekers 
(the ILO ‘unemployed); those who would like work but are not currently taking 
steps to pursue it; and those who, for one reason or another, profess not to be 
interested in work at present.   
 
For migrants from rich countries the proportion in work is quite close to that of 
the UK-born ‘non-migrant’ group, though more of the recent arrivals report 
                                                 
23 Strictly the division of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) identified as ‘activities 
auxiliary to financial intermediation’.  
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themselves as actively seeking work.  Among those from asylum origins, 
however, only a quarter of the recent arrivals appear to be in  work; almost as 
many say they are actively seeking it (though they may be legally 
constrained in doing so), while a half say they do not want it.  The 
employment rate is twice as high among those who have been in the country 
for more than three years, but still only about half of these prime age migrants 
are in work, well below the UK norm of 80%.  Among others from poor 
countries too, the proportion in work though higher is still below average, 
partly because of a higher unemployment rate, but largely on account of a 
much higher proportion not wanting work (about 20% as compared with 10% 
among the UK-born). 
 
Table 5.2: Employment status of London migrants by origin and time in the UK 
 
Status Non-
migrant 
 
Migrant 0-3 years Migrant > 3 years 
  Rich 
countries 
Asylum 
countries 
Other 
poor 
countries 
Rich 
countries 
Asylum 
countries 
Other 
poor 
countries 
Employed 
 
80% 75% 26% 64% 79% 54% 65% 
Seeking 
work 
5% 8% 20% 9% 5% 8% 7% 
Others 
wanting 
work 
4% 4% 7% 6% 5% 9% 7% 
Not 
wanting 
work 
10% 13% 47% 21% 11% 29% 21% 
Source: Annual Population Survey (APS), 2005-6. 
Notes: 1. This data relates to individuals aged between 25 and 44.   2. For information on sample sizes see 
Table 3.4. 
 
The higher proportion not wanting work among migrants coming from poor 
countries seems to be in large part a cultural phenomenon, particular 
reflecting the fact that only a quarter of the Muslim women migrants from 
poor countries (in this age group) are either working or looking for work.  
Another distinct sub-group among the ‘poor country’ migrants are the A8 
migrants (especially Poles) whose employment rates are at least the equal of 
non-migrants and those from rich countries.  Controlling for the differences in 
ethnic and religious composition roughly halves the differences in probabilities 
of employment between natives and migrants from poor countries.  Even 
among the group in the country for over 3 years, the chances of a poor 
country migrant being in work are about 6% lower than for a native with 
similar characteristics.  
 
A second issue is the quality of jobs to which migrants gain access.  We 
explore this by grouping detailed occupations into five equal-sized groups 
with similar average hourly earnings and tabulating the proportion of each of 
the migrant groups in each of these (Table 5.3).  Again, these show a wide 
distribution of migrants across types of job, but with two conspicuous 
deviations.  On the one hand, there is an above average concentration of 
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migrants from rich countries in the top quintile, especially in relation to the 
recent migrants (who in this case will include many temporary migrants).  On 
the other hand, recent migrants from poor countries (most of whom will 
become permanent migrants) figure much more prominently in the bottom 
quintile, though this ceases to be the case for those who have been in the 
country longer, implying that this is a relatively short-term phenomenon for 
many who then successfully advance to better jobs.   
 
Table 5.3: Distribution of migrant employment across higher and lower paid 
job types in London, 2005-6 
 
Migrant 
origin 
Years 
in the 
UK 
Bottom 
quintile 
(< £9.0 
p.h.) 
2nd 
quintile 
(£9.0-
£11.5) 
3rd 
quintile 
(£11.5-
£15.8) 
4th 
quintile 
(£15.8-
£20.8) 
 
Top 
quintile 
(> £20.8 
p.h.) 
Non-
migrant 
.. 21% 20% 21% 19% 20% 
High wage 
countries 
0-3  18% 14% 12% 21% 35% 
 > 3  19% 15% 16% 22% 28% 
 
Asylum 
countries 
0-3  31% 24% 14% 13% 18% 
 > 3  23% 20% 14% 21% 22% 
 
Other low 
wage 
countries 
0-3  46% 20% 10% 14% 11% 
 > 3  
 
25% 19% 16% 17% 22% 
Source: Annual Population Survey (APS), 2005-6. 
Note: For information on sample sizes see Table 3.4.   2. P.h. – per hour. 
 
In terms of actual average earnings, the pattern again is that those coming 
from rich countries do as well (or among the longer-stayers), better than non-
migrants, but that those from poor countries – whose qualification levels are 
also above the average for Londoners, get substantially lower average 
earnings (Table 5.4).  This is especially clear in the first three years, when they 
appear to receive about 40% below the London average.  For those who 
have been in London longer a clear differential remains, even though their 
distribution across higher and lower paying job types is by then not much 
different from the London norm.  For the newly arrived A8 migrants, the 
difference appears even greater, with average earnings of just £6.00 per hour 
recorded. 
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Table 5.4: Average hourly earnings of migrants and non-migrants in London 
2005-6, (£) 
 
 Time in  UK 
 
Males Females All 
Rich country 
migrants 
< 3 years 16.7 13.2 15.5 
 > 3 years 19.0 14.8 16.6 
Asylum origins < 3 years 10.4 9.4 9.9 
 > 3 years 12.7 10.7 11.8 
Other poor 
country 
migrants 
< 3 years 8.9 7.6 8.3 
 > 3 years 13.3 10.9 12.1 
Non-migrant  (UK-born) 17.0 13.2 15.0 
Source: Annual Population Survey (APS), 2005-6. 
Note: For information on sample sizes see Table 3.4. 
 
5.3 Impacts of migrants on the London labour market 
The question of how the presence of a stream of international migrants 
affects the position of native workers, in terms of their earnings and prospects 
of employment has been extensively discussed in the economic literature, 
with a series of empirical studies using both national and city/regional data to 
examine the actual direction and practical significance of these effects.  In 
principle, the three key issues influencing how the position of native workers 
might be affected are: 
 
• whether the presence of the migrant group adds more to the supply or 
the demand for labour in the area concerned; 
• whether by enabling a growth in the volume of local output and 
employment, migrants allow local producers to benefit from extended 
scale economies, thus raising productivity levels and sales; and 
• whether the effective skill mix offered by migrant workers is more 
complementary than competitive with those of the local labour force. 
 
Empirical studies of actual impacts in particular cases in North America and 
Western Europe have come up with a range of results, but a recent ‘meta-
analysis’ (i.e. systematic review) of the published studies has concluded that 
on balance they point to very small negative effects for both wages and 
employment – though this is only really clear in Europe and for women (Longhi 
et al, 2004, 2006).   
 
In the UK, the leading study finds that there is no overall effect on native 
employment (though the most educated may gain at the expense of those 
with intermediate levels of education), while the wage effect is, if anything, 
positive (Dustmann et al., 2005).  At city level in the US, Ottaviano and Peri 
(2005, 2006) report a positive effect on wages (but also on rents), which they 
ascribe to an effect of diversity on productivity levels.  Finally, in a Bank of 
England analysis directed at the macroeconomic implications of A8 
immigration, Blanchflower et al. (2007) argue both that this influx should lower 
the ‘natural rate’ of unemployment (i.e. the structural element of 
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unemployment) and moderate inflation by lowering the pressure of demand 
for labour.  Empirically, however, an examination of regional evidence finds 
no significant effects so far on unemployment.  
 
We have explored these issues firstly by adopting a labour market accounting 
approach, looking both at how growth of the foreign born labour force over 
the recent years of very high immigration has affected the balance between 
labour supply and demand and whether over time it has affected the relation 
between (un)employment rates in London and its hinterland.  Secondly, we 
have focused on the particular issue of how a more elastic labour supply for 
low status jobs is likely to have affected employment levels and earnings for 
those in this exposed sector of the London labour market.    
 
Supply and demand balance 
The impact of large scale immigration on the balance between labour supply 
and demand in the region is a potentially significant issue for London, where 
overall employment has been more or less stable since about 2000 – and 
where attention has recently been drawn to the fact that its employment 
rates are among the lowest in the country (Meadows, 2006; HMT, 2006, 2007).   
 
Looking back over the 8 years from 1997 when London has experienced 
consistently high levels of immigration, Table 5.5 shows how this has been 
reflected in the changing shares of UK and foreign born workers in London 
employment on both a residence and workplace basis.  Overall, during this 
period jobs in London grew by about 1% p.a. (about half as fast again as in 
the rest of the country)24 with the net addition of some 317 thousand jobs, 
virtually all of which accrued to members of the foreign born workforce, 
whose numbers grew by more than a third over these years (despite a very 
sharp fall in the number of Irish-born workers in the city).  The number of British 
born-workers working in London seems to have been unchanged over these 
years when the London economy was showing above average growth.  
 
On a residence basis, there does seem to have been some increase in the 
employment of this group, primarily because more commuted out to jobs in 
the adjoining regions.  Overall, net growth in employment among London 
residents recorded in this period was very largely (about 87%) concentrated 
among the growing immigrant population.  Elsewhere in the UK, the 
proportionate growth in the foreign-born workforce over these years was 
even more rapid (up by 56%), compared with 39% in London.  Since their 
initial share of employment was very much lower, a majority of the additional 
jobs in other regions accrued to British-born workers, whose employment there 
grew half as fast again as it did for their counterparts in London25.          
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 LFS which the ONS (2006) recommends as providing the most reliable guide to employment 
numbers at the regional scale.  
25 This comparison is not affected by any significant change in London’s share of the UK British-
born working age population.  
 54 
Table 5.5: Changes in employment of natives and foreign-born by workplace 
and residence in London, 1998-2005 
 
 1997 Q4 
(000’s) 
 
2006 Q1 
(000’s) 
Change in 000’s 
and (%) 
Total employed London residents: 
 
3,102 3,490 +388      (13%) 
    Of which: UK-born 2,242 2,293 +51        (2%) 
                      Non-UK born   860 1,197     +337      (39%) 
Total employed with London 
workplaces: 
3,559 3,876 +317        (9%) 
    Of which: UK-born 2,681 2,683              +2        (0%) 
                      Non-UK born   878 1,193          +315      (36%) 
Source: UK LFS. 
Note: All figures are grossed up from sample data, covering some 7,000 employed respondents in London. 
 
From this simple accounting comparison we cannot infer anything directly 
about how unemployment or other forms of worklessness in London may have 
been affected by the injection of a large new element of labour supply.  One 
point that is evident from Table 5.5, is the degree to which potential increases 
in worklessness among UK-born London residents have been mitigated by 
adjustments in commuting patterns.  The openness of urban labour markets to 
such switches in travel to work patterns is one of the major reasons why it is not 
easy/valid to transfer findings from inter-urban comparisons of migration 
effects to what may hold across the country as a whole.  From past research 
we know that changes in Greater London employment or population levels 
on their own have very limited effects on London unemployment, because a 
very large proportion of the differential effect expected in London leaks out 
to the surrounding regions, which are effectively part of the same labour 
market.  Only at the scale of the Greater South East as a whole26 do we 
expect to find important effects from such changes on levels of worklessness. 
 
To look for evidence of possible effects of immigration into London on 
worklessness in the city and region, we therefore carried out two parallel time 
series analyses (for the years 1984-2005), adapting a model previously used to 
examine the effects of broader changes in employment and the working age 
population on unemployment rates (Gordon, 1996).  The first of these focused 
on the differential between the key variables (employment growth rates and 
current/lagged unemployment rates) in Greater London and the Greater 
South East as a whole – now adding in immigration to London as an 
additional factor.  The second repeated this analysis for differentials between 
the Greater South East and the UK as a whole.   
 
In the first case, the results were dominated by the interaction between the 
two regions, with evidence of a strong tendency to convergence in their 
(un)employment rates confirming the degree of integration of their labour 
markets.  Neither differences in employment growth rates nor immigration into 
London were found to have any significant effect on the difference between 
                                                 
26 Including the current South Eastern and Eastern official regions as well as London. 
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(un)employment rates in London.  At the broader regional scale, integration 
was obviously much less, evidence of convergence was much weaker, and 
differences in employment growth rates were reflected in (un)employment 
rates.  London immigration did not, however, appear to have significantly 
affected the level of unemployment across this wider region, though there 
was a (possibly significant) indication of lowered economic activity rates27. 
 
In other words, despite the large addition to labour supply represented by the 
volume of immigration to London during the later years, we find no evidence 
that this bears any responsibility for the particularly low employment rates 
within London.  Further, nor has it impacted on unemployment across the 
wider region.   
 
Impacts on the bottom end of the labour market 
The fact that, despite qualifications levels which are above the London 
average, migrants from poor countries are disproportionately liable to find 
employment in their early years within the bottom quintile of jobs in pay terms 
(Table 5.3), may have significant effects on both the development of this 
quintile and on the pay of those who already work in it.  In principle we should 
expect this to lower pay rates within the quintile, but if the number of jobs in 
this low paid sector does not increase disproportionately as a result, the 
insertion of new migrant workers may have additional effects, either serving to 
expel some of the existing workforce into unemployment, or allowing some of 
them to move upwards into better jobs. 
 
In this study we can only investigate this issue in a preliminary way, rather than 
through formal econometric modelling.  A simple charting of trends in the pay 
levels and employment concentration for lowest quintile jobs in London 
relative to the rest of the UK, however, provides some suggestive evidence.  
As Figure 5.1 indicates, since the mid-1990s the wage differential between 
London and the rest of the UK for those in this bottom tier of jobs has been 
very substantially eroded.  In 1995 London wages were on average 23% 
above those for the same set of occupations in the rest of the UK; by 2001 this 
differential was down to 6%.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 The student’s statistic has a value of 1.9 (significant only at the 7% level).  
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Figure 5.1: Trends in employment share and wages for jobs in the bottom 
quintile  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Analysis by Loannis Kaplanis (2007) of New Earnings Survey microdata. 
Note: The bottom quintile is defined here in relation to a set of occupations, with 20% of employment 
nationally in a reference year, which had the lowest rates of hourly earnings across the country as a whole. 
 
On almost any estimate of the relative costs of living (at least for those 
bearing their own housing costs) this means that their real earnings were 
actually below those in other parts of the country.  No such change occurred 
for jobs further up the distribution, nor was it evident in earlier years.  There 
must therefore be at the least a very strong suspicion that the real wages of 
those working in the worst paid set of jobs in London have been substantially 
reduced as a consequence of the influx of new migrants, many of who, 
though formally qualified for better jobs, have been unable to access them at 
the point of arrival in London.   
 
As the lower part of Figure 5.1 indicates, there has been a positive knock-on 
effect, with the number of jobs in this segment of the labour market, which 
had been on a downward trend in earlier years, showing a substantial upturn, 
both absolutely and relative to trends in the rest of the UK.  In fact by 2001 
there were some 20% more jobs in this segment of employment (which 
includes many personal service jobs) than would be expected on the basis of 
past trends in London and current changes in the rest of the country.   
 
In this case regression analyses relating annual changes in each region to the 
wage in the preceding year show a very clear (negative) statistical relation.  
This suggests strongly that the lowering of wages in this segment has actually 
generated additional jobs, absorbing a large part of the additional labour 
supply, and restraining any tendency for a growth in unemployment within 
London.  This appears to be a substantial cost in terms of earnings to those 
existing workers who cannot climb out of this low wage sector to better jobs. 
 
One interesting side-aspect of this development is the light it casts on 
developments in London’s partner ‘global city’ New York during the 1980s.  
During that period, as was highlighted by Sassen (1991) there was a 
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conspicuous growth in jobs at the bottom end of the pay scale, as well as a 
(larger one) in the top half of the distribution.  This ‘polarisation’ of 
opportunities was attributed to the effects of the growth of global city roles, 
which made the city an uneconomic location for most kinds of routine jobs for 
less qualified workers, but with the exception of the kinds of (mostly low level) 
servicing job requiring face to face contact, and for which increasingly 
affluent high end business service workers had growing demands.  This 
tendency was not actually evident in London during this period, however 
(Buck et al., 2002; Hamnett, 2003), or indeed in other leading European cities.  
Indeed estimates of data comparable to that in Figure 5.1 for this earlier 
period shows London’s share of the bottom end jobs then falling, while 
earnings in these jobs were growing faster than in the rest of the country.    
 
One suggested explanation of this difference in trends between London and 
New York during the 1980s was that, because of its much greater openness at 
that time to international migration, only New York City then had the kind of 
highly elastic labour supply for such servicing jobs to allow potential demands 
to be fulfilled at acceptable prices.  The more recent trends in migration in 
relation to wages and employment in the low paid service sector of the 
London economy tend to bear that out.  The key issue is, however, not that 
there has been an expansion of such jobs, in catering, cleaning and similar 
services.  Rather it is that of the negative effects on existing workers of the 
downward pressure in wages that immigration has enabled to occur. 
 
5.4 Entrepreneurship, innovation and competitiveness 
Entrepreneurship 
Historically there has been a strong association between immigration and 
entrepreneurship, in the sense of foreign-born communities producing more 
individuals who are prepared to commit their own resources to business 
ventures involving a high degree of uncertainty and some element of novelty.  
A number of factors have been seen as contributing to this link, including: 
 
• the particular dispositions, abilities and character of those who willingly 
take on the risks of migrating to an unfamiliar country in hope of long-term 
gains; 
• a superior knowledge among migrant ‘outsiders’ about the value of their 
own talents and knowledge, in situations where this is not fully recognised 
by employers in the host community; and 
• the potential within a particular minority community that has strong 
internal networks sustaining trust and co-operation to mobilise financial 
and other resources in support of new businesses, more readily than may 
be possible in the majority community.   
 
Examples can be found of all of these, but they clearly do not apply equally 
to all migrant groups.  Indeed the story of migrant entrepreneurship is one 
which involves the experience of some migrant groups in particular (not all), 
and has been more conspicuous in some settings.  Within the US, which offers 
the broadest set of comparisons, there have been large differences among 
groups with different national origins in the propensity toward self-
employment (which is the simplest indicator of entrepreneurial tendencies), 
with the highest rates being found among those who also display the highest 
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average earnings as employees (presumably reflecting their human capital 
resources)28.  Comparisons of the entrepreneurial record of some groups from 
the same origin – European Jews at the start of the 20th century (Godley, 
2001) and Jamaicans more recently (Foner, 1979) – sending migrants both to 
New York and London, in New York/the US against London/the UK also point 
to much stronger evidence of entrepreneurship among migrants coming into 
the culture where this is more strongly valued (i.e. the US). 
 
In London, the incidence of self-employment among the foreign-born within 
the 25-45 year old population in 2005-6 was comparable with that for natives 
in the case of established (3 year plus) migrants from rich countries (at 14%) 
but significantly lower among both recent arrivals and the established 
migrants from poor countries (8% and 11% respectively).  The main exception 
seems to be that of migrants from Eastern and Central Europe (including what 
are now the A8 countries), both new and established, with 23% self-
employment in this age group. 
 
Self-employment is, on its own, not an adequate indicator of entrepreneurial 
potential, however, as Working Capital found in reviewing the position of 
ethnic minority businesses in London: 
  
‘One case where social variables have been thought to be significant 
is that of immigrant groups (and their descendants) with particularly 
strong communal networks – for example the South Asian and Chinese 
communities in London, which are known to have higher rates of self-
employment.  It is not clear, however, to what degree this self-
employment reflects particular resources of entrepreneurship, which 
can be combined with the distinctive skills, energies and connections 
of immigrant groups, rather than a defensive response to discrimination 
in the open labour market. 
 
Clearly there are success stories, but the general picture presented by 
responses to the 1999 London Employer Survey is that a preponderance of 
businesses run by members of non-white groups are very small enterprises, 
oriented to limited local markets and facing particular problems in growing.  
This is particularly true of those groups (blacks, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) in 
the weakest position in the general labour market, but even for Indians and 
Chinese, who are more successful, employment in minority-owned businesses 
(totalling 10% for all non-white groups) is clearly below their share in the 
population.  Managers seemed generally optimistic about growth prospects, 
but reported particular constraints both in relation to finance and the 
competitiveness of their products (reflecting low rates of product innovation 
in the case of black and Pakistani/Bangladeshi businesses).  Orientation to the 
national market is generally weak, and though there are some significant 
examples of businesses serving overseas markets (notably South Asian-owned 
hotels), the main bias is still toward direct sales functions in local or London-
wide markets.   
 
                                                 
28 See Gordon (1995), using data from Portes and Zhou (1995). 
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The one significant advantage evident in the survey was that Asian-owned 
businesses were less likely to perceive skill shortages as a constraint, perhaps 
because they have access to under-employed skills from within their own 
communities.  Business success could offer much to these communities, but 
this will require stronger connections to the external market, and at present 
intra-communal networks are inadequate as a means of overcoming 
constraints’  (Buck et al., 2002, pp.132-133). 
   
These conclusions were based on evidence from the late 1990s, and referred 
to ethnic minority businesses rather than those owned by recent migrants of 
all origins.  More recent data on the size of these businesses (from the 2005 
London Business Survey) does suggest that most of these remain small, while 
there are still no systematic data on migrant-owned businesses as such.  It is 
necessary to be cautious therefore, about the extent to which recent 
migration has served to boost the level of entrepreneurship in the London 
economy.   
 
Innovation 
Arguments about the potential for strengthening London’s performance in 
terms of innovation through development of a culturally more diverse 
workforce are the hardest to evaluate empirically.  We have been unable to 
find any London-based evidence which casts significant light on this.  It is 
useful therefore to point to work elsewhere which indicates what kind of 
effects might be expected, and questions that might usefully be investigated 
in the context of London’s post-industrial economy. 
 
Two recent US-focused studies in particular argue that there are specific 
connections between the immigration of well-qualified groups and levels of 
innovation, at least in relation to scientific and high-technology activities.  
Anderson and Latzer (2006) focus on venture-capital-backed companies, 
reporting that 25% of all those founded in the past 15 years (with 400 
thousand employees worldwide) had one or more immigrant founder.  The 
proportion rose to 40% among those in high-tech and 47% among the latest 
wave of start-ups.  The principal country of origin was India, with a quarter of 
the migrant founders, while a similar proportion came from Europe (almost 
half of these from the UK).  Half had gone to the US as graduate students, 
typically founding their businesses 10 or so years later.   
 
Businesses interviewed in the study believed that the potential for further 
growth of innovative enterprises had been constrained by the tightening up 
of US immigration controls in respect of temporary H1-B visas for highly skilled 
workers and long waits to acquire green cards for permanent residence.  
Other studies have suggested that the knock-on effects of this include 
diversion of some flows (e.g. of Latin Americans) to Europe and 
encouragement for off-shoring of more highly skilled jobs in sectors such as IT.  
 
A complementary study by Chellaraj et al. (2005) focuses on patents as an 
indicator of technological innovation.  It indicates that the dramatic growth in 
both highly skilled immigration to the US and in foreign graduate students 
recruitment had made a considerable contribution to increased rates of 
patenting, both in the university and commercial sectors.  The message 
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again, is one of concern about the impacts of tighter US controls since 2001 
on diverting flows and innovation growth elsewhere, particularly in the 
context of Asian countries’ investments in their own higher education sectors.    
 
Findings of these studies clearly cannot be transposed directly to a UK 
context, or to London’s service-based economy. They raise interesting 
questions, not only about the impact of skilled labour migrants, but also about 
the extent to which London’s capacity to attract large numbers of high 
quality graduate students could produce comparable spill-over effects for 
some of its advanced producer and cultural services.  Impacts of this kind 
could be very important for London’s competitiveness, but this is a field where 
argument currently runs well ahead of solid evidence. 
 
Labour quality and competitiveness 
In London, the link between migration and competitiveness has been most 
directly seen in relation to the availability of very highly skilled staff with 
international banking experience in Y/Zen’s (2005) study of international 
financial and related business services.  They make the important point that 
not only is competitiveness/productivity factor, sustaining the continuing 
primacy of London and New York, but that this combination of skill and 
experience could only effectively be acquired in these centres.  Specifically 
they argue that there is a virtuous circle linking: 
 
• the boost to a career in international financial services provided to those 
who come initially to work in London: and  
• the boost to London’s own competitiveness provided by the contributions 
of this cadre of talented migrants (also including those from the English-
speaking world, with more experience, who come to London for a taste of 
Europe).  
 
The point to note here is not simply that the ability to attract international 
recruits is perceived as an integral element in the City’s competitiveness.  It is 
also that most of those involved are not expected to be permanent migrants 
to the UK, rather to figure amongst the turnover of well-qualified migrants from 
rich countries staying in London for a few years or so.   
 
A subsequent study on recruitment into these businesses (Dawson et al., 2006) 
found that some 22% of graduate recruits into these activities were drawn 
from overseas, though they highlighted the role of European recruits, 
especially from France and Germany29.  Beyond the simple consideration of 
enlarging the pool of well qualified applicants, they suggest that employers 
particularly valued some of the skills and experiences international students 
had to offer.  In part this appeared to be a matter of self-selection, or 
selective efforts by recruiters which meant that they were more likely to see 
just the top end of foreign graduates.  Beyond this, however, cultural diversity, 
languages, international experience and maturity were seen as particular 
strengths among the international recruits.   
 
                                                 
29 They suggest that a factor in these two countries was the relatively weak state of domestic 
demand.  
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Looking a bit more widely, a broadly based mail survey by LCCI (2004) of 
London businesses reported a high level of satisfaction with the work 
produced by ‘migrant workers’30.  Reasons given for satisfaction included not 
only their readier availability and greater willingness to do the job, but also 
(from a quarter) their higher level of education.  This is not inconsistent with 
the evidence reported earlier about qualifications levels, but probably also 
reflects the fact that currently much of the migrant workforce seems to be 
employed at below the level of similarly qualified locals.  The incidence of 
language problems, reported as the only significant weakness of migrants, 
would be part of the reason for this element of 
overqualification/underemployment.   
 
Another (national) poll for the Institute of Directors (2007) found majorities of 
their members reporting migrant workers as also being superior in terms of 
productivity, reliability, low sick leave and (especially) their work ethic – 
though they acknowledge that there were no controls for the relative youth 
of migrants31.  In fact, both polls seem to relate primarily to more recent 
migrants, rather than to settled groups.  This was the case too with Dench et 
al.’s (2006) more representative survey, directed toward use of migrant worker 
schemes, which reported similar kinds of perceived advantages, but 
concluded overall that: 
 
‘Generally, across all sectors, employers expressed no real preference 
for either migrant or domestic workers… Many argued that they simply 
reacted to the pool of available labour and sought to recruit the best 
qualified applicants, regardless of nationality.  There was little, if any, 
variation between the characteristics that employers were looking for 
in migrant workers compared to domestic workers (as they were both 
required to fill the same type of job).  The only difference was that 
migrants were more prepared to accept certain jobs.  The importance 
of good English, previous work experience and qualifications varied 
between employment sectors and the nature of the job’ (p. vi). 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The most basic effect of international migration to London, over the last 
decade in particular, is that it has brought to the city a very large additional, 
youthful supply of labour, with an above average level and range of 
qualifications at a time when an unusually sustained period of growth was 
producing a rather tight labour market, especially for highly skilled 
occupations.  As such it has undoubtedly relaxed some constraints on growth 
associated with skill bottlenecks and allowed employers of the more 
specialised skills to select from a wider pool of talent – even though such 
effects are hard to demonstrate, and not directly addressed by existing 
research focused on this city. 
 
                                                 
30 Though it is not clear what this term means, the proportions of firms’ workforce falling into this 
category tend to be well below that of foreign-born workers in the overall London workforce.  It 
seems to relate only to more recently arrived groups of migrants. 
31 It should also be noted that this poll may especially reflect recent experience with Polish 
workers where 54% of respondents report as employing, three times the proportion for the next 
largest group (namely Indians).  
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In some contrast to earlier waves of migration, those coming to London in this 
period have found jobs in a very widespread set of activities.  It is clear, 
however, that the potential of parts of the new labour force have been rather 
under-exploited in its early years, with rather low employment rates, earnings 
levels and qualitative under-employment for some years for many of those 
coming from lower wage economies.  Formally at least this is not a low skill 
labour force, although one requiring some adaptation, but a substantial 
proportion have started off in low skill jobs in activities where there are fewer 
barriers to entry.   
 
Though the distinction is not a very clear-cut one, the flows from rich and from 
poor countries appear to have played rather different roles, partly because of 
differences in migrants’ intentions with regard to staying in the UK over the 
long-run.  The particular contribution of those coming from rich countries, 
many of whom come and go, seems to have been to provide more flexibility 
in hiring, to enlarge the recruitment pool for specialised jobs and to facilitate 
internationalisation.  Those coming from poor countries on the other hand, 
who represent more permanent additions to the London labour force, seem 
rather to represent a quantitatively elastic supply of labour facilitating growth 
in employment where it might otherwise be constrained. 
 
The start of the peak period of immigration coincided with a couple of years 
of substantial net employment growth in London at the end of the 1990s, 
when that role would clearly be important.  Since then, however, continuing 
output growth has been accompanied by more or less stable employment 
levels in London.  Supply growth thus seems to have outstripped demand, 
though immigration does not actually appear to have raised unemployment 
within London, at least partly because of a further growth in outward 
commuting.  Across the wider Greater South East, however, there is some 
evidence that it has tended to depress overall labour force participation rates 
to some extent. 
 
We have not seen any evidence that migration has significantly depressed 
either employment or general earnings levels for existing workers in most of 
the London labour market.  At the bottom end of the labour market, in 
occupations employing the lowest paid 20% or so of the workforce, it does, 
however, seem that pay levels have been quite substantially eroded since 
the mid-1990s.  This is probably as a consequence of the crowding of the most 
recent arrivals from poor countries into these jobs.  
 
A positive side effect, keeping up employment rates, has been a substantial 
upturn in employment in this sector, as lower costs increased the affordability 
of a range of personal and support services demanded particularly by those 
in the growing number of highly paid professional jobs.  There seem likely to 
have been substantial penalties for those existing workers in these jobs who 
could not move on up the jobs ladder. 
 
Over the long-run an increasingly diverse labour force, as well as a larger and 
more highly skilled one, is expected to provide a qualitative boost to a host 
city’s competitiveness, via increased entrepreneurship, innovation and 
productivity.  Indications of such effects have been reported elsewhere from 
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comparison across sets of cities.  Such comparisons are probably more 
difficult in the UK, since London’s position is unique in many other ways – while 
time lags in competitiveness effects mean that we should probably not 
expect to find evidence of them simply by tracking changes over time in 
London.  
 
In any event, we have found little evidence which could be used to assess 
how far such benefits are actually accruing to the London economy.  
Available indicators of business ownership show nothing significant, while 
suitable indicators of innovation performance are lacking.  In relation to 
productivity, employers have, however, been notably positive about the 
benefits of employing migrants.  It is not clear how far this may be simply a 
matter of being able to access and afford a better class of worker from this 
source, as distinct from achieving qualitative improvements in the production 
process.    
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6 Migration, diversity and London government 
 
The radical increase in UK in-migration during the past two decades has had 
its most substantial and concentrated impacts in London, both in quantitative 
and qualitative terms, with the city acquiring a much more cosmopolitan 
character.  London is also the place where, on the whole, people have 
responded most positively to increased internationalisation, with younger 
residents in particular reporting the mixture of people as one of the best things 
about life in the city.  As we have seen in the last two chapters, there are, 
however, some real conflicts associated with high rates of immigration, both 
in respect of access to resources allocated outside the market (notably social 
housing) and of the effects of a shifting balance of supply and demand on 
wages and prices (notably on the real earnings of those in entry level jobs).  
For governments in the city, migration presents both opportunities and 
challenges: to make the most of the potential for boosting London’s 
competitive position; to cope with a new and more diverse set of demands, 
both for services; to mitigate the particular disadvantages which some groups 
of migrants may experience; and to reconcile or mediate some of the 
conflicts which are engendered in order to maintain both social cohesion 
and political support.    
 
Few of these kinds of issues are actually seen as ‘migration’ as such, both 
because the local authorities have no real influence over the number or type 
of international migrants who come, and because issues are more familiarly 
seen in terms of ethnic minorities, tenure groups or those with particular 
health, social or economic needs.  Indeed the current waves of migrants are 
so diverse in their characteristics, in their engagement with the city, and the 
social/political supports they have available to them that it makes little sense 
to treat them as a discrete group.   
 
Significantly, the nearest approximation to a migrant-focused set of policies in 
London, have been ones constructed around the concept of ‘diversity’.  
These seek to bring together established lines of action to promote equal 
opportunities for disadvantaged groups (such as black and minority ethnic 
groups), with more positive/optimistic ideas about the potential of diversity as 
an economic resource in an era of more qualitative competition.   
 
In this chapter, we first sketch some of the significant differences between 
groups of migrants which have a bearing on the engagement of local 
governments with them.  We then discuss how the diversity agenda is being 
pursued in London, before considering some of the more specific kinds of 
service needs which various migrant groups raise, together with the financial 
issues, which these engender.   
 
6.1 Different types of migrant 
This study has identified three broad types of migrant.  The first group is made 
up of internationally mobile people working in finance, business and other 
highly-paid activities. The second type consists of skilled or semi-skilled 
individuals who move to London to fill jobs where there are shortages of 
labour within the UK.  The third type includes refugees, asylum seekers and 
other individuals or families who come to Britain in search of protection for 
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themselves and their families.  Inevitably, these groups do not fully describe all 
migrant types, while there is an overlap between the categories. 
 
The ‘internationally mobile’ group largely comprises people with well 
recognized skills of an advanced kind, an international outlook, and an 
adequate command of English.  This group comes to work in an 
internationalized sector of the economy (much of it now foreign-owned), 
where their contributions are highly valued and their legal status is secured 
through a combination of employers’ efforts and public policy priority for 
highly skilled and/or entrepreneurial migrants.  The existence of the City has 
clearly influenced conditions that appear to make London an attractive 
place for rich migrants from many countries.  The arrival of substantial number 
of individuals from Russia, India, the Middle East and the US suggests the 
mixture of financial, cultural and political institutions in the city together 
encourage the settlement of a new kind of mobile elite within it. 
 
The ‘skilled/semi-skilled’ groups include a wide range of people.  They range 
from the less qualified/experienced migrants from other relatively rich 
economies, and large numbers from many poorer countries with some 
marketable skill, work permits, and varying degrees of social support from 
employers who may have recruited them or established migrant communities 
from their areas of origin.  Their employment prospects and conditions are 
more variable, not least because they may be subject to some forms of racial 
or religious prejudice, and may need to overcome some degree of language 
or cultural barrier.  
 
One of the latest examples is the influx of A8 migrants, notably from Poland.  
Such migrants have been given a clear right to work in the UK, who can draw 
on some significant support from community institutions and informal networks 
built up by post war migrants.  They have achieved very high employment 
rates and a positive reputation, but often in poorly paid jobs below their skill 
potential.  In some respects they may have taken over roles occupied by Irish 
migrants, before Irish GDP per head overtook that of the UK and the flow of 
migration went into reverse.  Migrants from the Caribbean and South Asia 
can draw on some of the same institutional resources, including rather more 
informal and voluntary bodies part-funded by local authorities, but have 
variable access to employment and reputations.  
 
As with the first group (i.e. the internationally, affluent, mobile), however, it 
appears that majorities of both these groups move to London as a matter of 
personal choice and, once they have arrived, require relatively little 
assistance from the public authorities, though they will often have some 
distinctive service needs to be met.  In the newest case of the A8 migrants, a 
number of councils have reported issues such as residential overcrowding, 
and exploitation or destitution among migrants from these countries, though 
there is little evidence of substantial public service need.     
 
It is the third group of migrants that has attracted most attention and have 
required substantial government and local authority intervention.  Because of 
the preponderance of new migrants within London, any problems and public 
service costs have inevitably been concentrated in the capital.  
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Major cities such as London have long been a magnet for those fleeing 
persecution, seeking personal freedom or simply wishing to start a new life.  
The combination of political security, employment opportunities and 
anonymity offered by London has long made it a popular destination for 
refugees and asylum seekers.  Global trade, regional conflicts, cheaper travel 
and the emergence of a more powerful human rights lobby have together 
led to an increase in cross-border movement.  Britain, by virtue of its trading 
history and international political position has, as shown in this report, seen a 
significant rise in in-migration since the 1980s.  Reforms to the country’s labour 
market and economy have probably encouraged the sharp rise in migration 
during the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
Poorer migrants may, like more affluent and skilled ones, move immediately 
into employment.  Others may be unemployed and may also have 
dependents.  Once people are legally settled in the UK, they have rights to 
access public services.  Even those who are seeking right of abode and/or 
who are living illegally in the country may access public services.  Local 
authorities are required, by law, to provide many services that new migrants 
may use.  Housing, translation services, employment assistance, schools, 
colleges and the costs of securing social cohesion may all be increased by 
the arrival of new migrants.  In some cases, of course, migrants may, by their 
aspiration, willingness to settle in and communal supports, reduce service 
costs.  It is to the issue of migration, the government’s response and public 
services that we turn next.                  
 
6.2 Ethnicity, discrimination and the diversity agenda 
A significant difference in the context for the new, post-1980s waves of 
migration into cities such as London is that these are widely seen as integral to 
the development of culturally vibrant and competitively successful urban 
economies, rather than as primarily sources of replacement labour for either 
public services or uncompetitive manufacturing industries which could not 
keep up with market wages.  Diversity is now a watchword in the pursuit of 
competitive advantage.  Some racial/ethnic prejudices persist (while some 
religious ones may have intensified) and in any case, there is clearly a period 
of settling-in and adjustment for most new migrants.  The Mayor of London’s 
Economic Development Strategy outlined a number of problems:   
 
‘London’s refugees and asylum seekers, for example, face a number of 
specific barriers not only concerning discrimination and language, but 
also difficulties in obtaining recognition for non-UK qualifications and a 
concern among employers about the legal status of potential 
employees’ (MoL, 2005, 4.3). 
 
There is nothing very new in such a statement, indeed such concerns have 
led to a series of initiatives over the past thirty years or more, and remain 
rather more focused on minority ethnic populations than on migrants as such.  
Refugees and asylum seekers have been given some priority, but migrants as 
a whole have not been the object of major employment oriented policies.   
 
More specifically relevant initiatives include the LDA’s Migrants Qualification 
Project which is intended to enhance the employment opportunities of 2,000 
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migrants in key sectors of the London economy such as medical, engineering 
and construction.  The project identifies the transferable skills and 
qualifications of migrant workers and supports them to fulfill their potential in 
the employment market. 
 
Policy interventions designed to increase the political and economic power 
of refugees have also been proposed by the Mayor of London.  The aims of 
refugee integration work in the capital is, according to the Mayor, ‘equality of 
opportunity for refugees, allowing them to contribute fully to the 
development of the city, in safety and dignity’ (Board for Refugee Integration 
in London, 2007).  The political and human rights needs of refugees are clearly 
seen as being of at least as much importance as their need for access to the 
labour market.  Moreover, many initiatives suggest services for refugees, 
asylum seekers and other migrants are badly fragmented, with a need for 
greater integration and consistency (London Asylum Seekers Consortium, 
2006, Section 2). 
 
Refugees and other poorer migrants face barriers to accessing education, 
training and employment services.  Services are all too often inaccessible to 
refugees being unfamiliar with the UK job search culture, having little or no 
understanding of the English language or work experience.  Those who 
already have skills or professions may have to retrain to become employable. 
Employer attitudes and lack of knowledge as well as the restrictions imposed 
on employing refugees can create additional problems (London Asylum 
Seekers Consortium, 2006, Section 3).  
 
At a broader level, the London Development Agency’s  Diversity Works for 
London initiative is concerned with ‘campaigning to engage private, public 
and voluntary sectors in promoting equality’ while ‘championing workforce 
and supplier diversity’; ‘enabling businesses to ensure that all levels of their 
workforce reflect the diversity of London’s population’ and ‘seeking out and 
promoting business good practice’ (LDA, 2007).  Migrants as such are not the 
specific focus of this programme, but it reflects a new more positive attitude 
toward migration in its emphasis on diversity as a potential economic asset at 
both business and city level, which employers need to find more effective 
ways of exploiting.  This orientation is reflected elsewhere in London agencies, 
for example in the Mayor’s Plan for Tourism in London, which sees cultural 
diversity as a key resource on which to draw in, promoting a more vibrant 
London tourist experience.  
 
6.3 Public service needs 
As mentioned above, some sets of migrants will make particular demands on 
public services.  There will be a number of demands for higher expenditure 
(than would otherwise have been the case) related to basic services such as 
electoral registration, the need to re-register council tax payers, planning 
service costs and the turn-over of pupils in schools.  Poorer migrants may 
increase demands on social housing, language services, council tax benefit 
costs and the need to inspect premises.  In extreme cases, there may be costs 
associated with destitution and homelessness.  Calculating the costs of these 
for individual boroughs or in total for London is very difficult (London Councils, 
2007). 
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In the longer term, there will need to be significant growth in infrastructure 
and other public service provision, though much of this additional demand 
will result from London’s projected rising population – caused by natural 
growth – rather than migration per se.  The city’s population is expected to 
grow to 8.1 million by 2016 and from then onwards towards 9 million.    
 
As we have already seen, the impact of in-migration on local services 
depends on the type of migrant.  English speaking visitors/migrants from richer 
countries can be expected to put relatively few demands on publicly 
provided services.  Lower income and non-working groups, particularly 
refugees and asylum seekers who initially often have no rights to work, 
however, put additional pressure on local services. 
 
In a related project (Travers et al., 2007) members of the team analysed the 
impact of household mobility, much of which will involve migrants (in London), 
on local services.  This research showed clearly that on average migrants use 
services less often than native households.  They are less likely to register with 
doctors – or indeed for other services including the electoral register/council 
tax registration; less likely to have children who will need school places; less 
likely to need social housing; less likely to use social services. 
 
There is, however, a subset particularly among those who do not speak 
English and who have no family with whom to stay, who will use local services 
disproportionately at least for some period.  The most important impacts 
identified by local authorities and other agencies were seen to be on:  
 
• Translation services and associated costs of information – compared with 
earlier waves of in-migration to the UK which were predominantly from 
English speaking countries, new migrants are more likely to arrive from non-
English speaking nations. 
 
• Housing administration, management and enforcement costs – among 
both new migrants and those who have settled in London there are a 
significant proportion who require assistance with housing in the short-
term, or on a longer term basis will require secure social housing.  The 
pressures on housing services add additional costs.   
 
• Services associated with asylum seekers and refugees – large numbers of 
such households do not go through the (centrally-funded) national system 
but rather go to family friends or support agencies – most of who live in 
London.  A proportion of these households are likely to put additional 
pressure on, housing and social services. 
 
• Homelessness provision and administration – some 65 thousand households 
in London are officially categorised as homeless.  These are categorised 
by ethnicity and household type but not migration status – except to the 
extent that they come from A8 or A10 countries.  The numbers of such 
households presenting as homeless is still very small, but is growing rapidly.  
To the extent that migration has increased demand for and pressure on 
the lower end of the housing market, it is clear that there are increased 
costs.  
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• Housing provision costs – Chapter 4 identifies the extent to which migration 
adds to the total demand for both social and total housing. Migration is 
directly associated with the majority of the additional housing required 
and an even larger proportion of the social housing.  This is a figure which 
comes out of a large number of gross inflows and outflows – many of the 
identified demands would not disappear if international migration fell.  
  
• Education – initially migrant costs here are lower than average, but over 
the next few decades the majority of children in London will be born to 
migrant mothers and it is clear that a younger population generated by in-
migration increases the demands for education services. 
  
• Social service costs – the most important source of additional costs is 
associated with children and therefore mainly with those migrants who 
remain for some time in the country.  The costs for older people are still 
much lower than average for native Londoners – although this will change 
over the longer term. 
 
• Registration costs – while a smaller proportion may actually register either 
for the electoral register or for council tax, there are higher costs 
associated with increased mobility, as well as with the information costs 
linked to more complex household backgrounds, and the need to follow 
up to increase coverage. 
 
• Impacts on social cohesion – there is general recognition that migration, 
mobility and diversity can test the social cohesion of neighbourhoods, with 
associated costs to maintaining services and reducing social exclusion.  
On the other hand, there is also recognition among local authorities and 
agencies that incomers can help to improve services and bring increased 
opportunity to the area.  In particular, there is a strong feeling that the 
increased diversity of incomers is helping to break down concentrations of 
particular groups and so to reduce inter-group tensions. 
 
Concerns about cohesion can often be directly related back to issues about 
access to services and the priority often given to new entrants to the area 
because of need.  In this context, rapid in-migration as well as rapid mobility 
can lead to a need for political management of public expectations and 
opinion. 
 
Overall the most important pressures appear to relate to concerns about 
access to housing because of the enormous shortages of social housing, and 
particularly larger units, available across London.  There are also growing 
concerns about the increasing importance of ‘Buy-to-Let’ housing in some 
areas – which may be let to concentrations of homeless households or to 
particular mobile groups. 
 
While it is relatively easy to identify the sources of cost increases, it is not easy 
to say which are associated with migration as opposed to mobility, or indeed 
ethnicity.  Moreover, there is surprisingly poor data on the direct costs to these 
services, in terms of additional staff, more investment and lower compliance 
with regulation.  These are clearly significant, but by no means all of them are 
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net increases, because we do not know what would be happening without 
the current experience of migration. 
 
From the point of view of the competitiveness of London’s economy the two 
main effects lie with (i) the quality of local services available to those either 
working in London or thinking of doing so and (ii) the bills that people have to 
pay to live in London through council tax.  On the first the evidence is limited, 
with both pros and cons from additional migration.  There is, however, clear 
general concern about the extent to which all services including in particular 
education, housing and transport are overstretched.  This relates mainly to 
problems of under-investment in infrastructure widely defined and to the 
maintenance of that infrastructure – both of which are associated with the 
size of the capital and its population as well as the rate of change in that size 
rather than specifically to migration.  
 
6.4 Resource allocation and population measurement 
The 32 London boroughs, the City and the GLA operate within a highly 
centralised system of public finance.  Despite London’s huge economy and 
tax-take, the city itself has little access to its own resources: over 95% of all tax 
revenues in the UK are paid to the Exchequer.  Council tax, the sole tax 
source determined beyond the centre (by local government), raises only 5% 
of all government income.  In addition, council tax is, in effect, capped.  The 
London boroughs, the City and the GLA thus have little direct access to the 
many billions of tax revenues raised from businesses and residents. 
 
London authorities, in common with those elsewhere in England and, indeed, 
other public bodies, receive funding either through centrally-determined 
distribution formulae or as the result of bidding systems.  Because London has 
a complex and rapidly-changing population of almost 8 million, the accuracy 
and fairness of formulae and bid-based allocation methods is significantly 
dependent upon the quality of data and other information available to 
official statistical agencies at the centre.  Funding formulae allocate billions of 
pounds each year to London’s boroughs, the GLA, schools, housing, the NHS, 
and for learning and skills. 
 
The quality of data in relation to migration and the impact this may have for 
needs-based resource allocation systems is a matter of significant concern to 
London boroughs and the GLA.  As a large proportion of all migrants to the UK 
locate themselves in London, any weaknesses in the measurement of migrant 
numbers will have a disproportionate impact on the grants allocated for local 
government, schools, the NHS and other purposes.   
 
Where national allocation formulae accurately reflect the need to spend on 
particular services from authority to authority (and region to region), and if the 
numbers used within the formulae are both accurate and timely, the costs of 
particular spending needs will be properly measured and thus funded 
appropriately by the formula concerned.  If the system worked effectively, 
national funding formulae would react to expenditure requirements within 
individual councils and move resources to meet them in broadly the way an 
authority might if it were deciding its own spending. 
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In circumstances where the formula and/or data were inaccurate or badly 
out-of-date, there will be a time-lag between the emergence of new 
spending needs and a borough’s capacity to meet them.  There is much 
evidence that the local government, schools and health formulae currently in 
use in England are based upon data whose accuracy is open to significant 
challenge.  
 
There has been growing controversy about London boroughs’ population 
totals since the first release of figures from the 2001 Census.  A number of 
boroughs challenged the published data, leading to some substantial 
adjustments being made.  More recently, efforts to improve the quality of 
data about the number of migrants arriving and staying in London have led 
to further criticisms of the boroughs’ population totals.  New figures have 
been produced that change the estimated number of migrants in each 
borough, and thus their overall populations.  This issue is discussed earlier in this 
report.  The ONS has accepted there are difficulties in measuring the London 
population as a result (at least in part) of migration (ONS, 2003). 
 
The Formula Grant (part of the Revenue Support Grant (RSG)), which is used 
to take account of spending need variations and for differences in the tax 
base, is thus most unlikely to reflect the expenditure requirements of the 
rapidly-changing migrant population within individual boroughs or even at 
the GLA level.  The formula currently takes account of factors such as 
‘children in black ethnic groups’ and ‘low achieving ethnic groups’.  These 
indicators, which do reflect the needs of some sections of the population, do 
not, of course, pick up the particular needs of migrants. 
 
Indeed, the existing Formula Grant does not explicitly attempt to measure the 
costs of new migrants or the transience traditionally associated with mobile 
big-city populations.  Research conducted for London Councils in early 2007 
identified the difficulty of even measuring some of the transience costs 
associated with migration and mobility.  No systematic evidence could be 
found about how new migrants impact on the boroughs’ costs.  It was only 
possible to make a number of broad estimates of some of these costs (Travers 
et al., 2007, Section 3). 
 
Changes implemented in recent years to the Formula Grant system will have 
further limited the possibility that the rapidly-changing spending needs 
inevitably generated by relatively high levels of in-migration could be 
reflected in the allocation of resources.  As a result of turbulence caused by 
regular changes to the grant, the government has largely frozen the formula 
actually used.  In addition to this change, so-called ‘damping’ mechanisms 
have been put in place to restrict the changes in grant received by an 
individual authority from one year to the next.  Schools’ funding has been 
ring-fenced and is now allocated using a formula that produces a broadly 
‘flat’ increase in funding from year to year.  Changes in pupil numbers, but 
not social needs, are fully reflected in allocations.  As a result of the changes 
outlined above, there is far less scope than in the past for newly-generated 
spending needs to be reflected in funding allocations.    
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The overall impact of the RSG arrangements as they impact on authorities 
with a high migrant population is likely to fall well short of a full reflection of 
the higher allocation of resources needed to meet the needs of the heavy 
flow of migrants into the city.  This will also be true in authorities such as Slough 
and Manchester, and even more rural ones in parts of Lincolnshire, which also 
have significant numbers of new migrants. 
 
There is another important issue relating to the operation of the RSG.  The 
near-full equalisation arrangements built into the RSG system mean that 
London authorities do not receive additional tax yield as a result of any 
growth in their council tax or non-domestic rate yield that comes from the 
economic growth that may result from migration.  The grant system operates 
in such a way as to equalise away any increase in an individual borough’s 
tax-base.   
 
As a result of this attribute of the grant arrangements, London faces costs as a 
result of relatively high and sustained levels of international in-migration, yet its 
authorities cannot derive the tax benefit that flows from this growth.  London 
must cope with public service costs while the Exchequer receives tax-yield 
benefits via national taxation.  Such a split between costs and benefits is, 
given the incapacity of the ‘needs’ part of the grant system to react to higher 
spending requirements; a recipe for social cohesion problems in areas with 
high additional costs but no way of deriving benefits from higher tax yields.    
 
The position in London is radically different from in a city such as New York 
where the local authorities can capture much of the tax growth that occurs 
as the population and economic activity grows.  In PLANYC, published earlier 
in 2007, Mayor Bloomberg projects a growth in tax yield of up to $13bn p.a. in 
the years up to 2030 which he plans to use to provide a flow of revenue to 
fund infrastructure improvements (Mayor of New York, 2007, p6). 
  
Under the current local government funding arrangements in London, neither 
the Mayor nor the boroughs have any such capacity.  There is a small and 
limited potential to capture part of any above-trend increases in the non-
domestic rate base through the so-called Local Authority Business Growth 
Incentives scheme.  The recently-published Lyons Inquiry report into local 
government made proposals to increase the tax incentives given to councils 
(Lyons, 2007, Chapter 9).  There is no immediate sign, however, that the 
government will allow London authorities to keep a larger share of their 
growing tax-base.   
 
Consequently, for the foreseeable future, any public service costs associated 
with the disproportionate number of relatively poor migrants who locate in 
London will continue to have to be met by the boroughs, the GLA and other 
public service providers.  Only if the formulae and other grant-allocation 
mechanisms can immediately respond to changes in population numbers 
and composition will London be in a position to meet the needs of its new 
residents (and, indeed, those who already live in the city).  There could be 
significant implications for social cohesion if London has to continue to meet 
all the public service costs of migration while the Exchequer enjoys all the tax 
gain benefits.   
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7 Conclusions 
 
7.1 The new migration into London 
The ‘new’ large scale migration into the UK on which this report focuses took 
off in the late 1980s but has really burgeoned in the last 10 years.  London has 
been a major focus for this recent influx, which has brought approaching 200 
thousand people per year into the city, with net gains of about half that size.  
Both quantitatively and qualitatively this differs from what had been 
experienced in any previous period.  London has doubled the proportion of 
foreign-born in its population, and now rivals New York and Toronto for the 
diversity of its population.  
 
The migrants themselves, though typically young, are otherwise very diverse, 
in terms of their origins, skills, and the circumstances in which they came to 
London.  One important general distinction in relation to their potential 
impacts on London’s economy is between those coming from richer countries 
and those from poorer countries.  Both are relatively well qualified but most of 
those from richer countries are liable to leave the country at some point – 
often quite soon; those from poorer countries are more likely to remain longer, 
thus contributing to long-term population growth both directly and through 
their UK-born children.  
 
In popular discourse there have been tendencies to equate migrants in 
general with the particular phenomenon of asylum-seeking; to confuse in-
migrants with ethnic or religious minority populations; and to assume that all 
those entering the country except on private visits are ‘immigrants’ who will 
remain more or less permanently.  An important aim of this report has been to 
cut through such confusions and identify the different ways in which groups of 
migrants engage with the London economy, particularly in relation to housing 
and labour markets, and local service provision.  
 
7.2 What we have learned 
Education, employment and productivity 
Migrants from all types of country tend to be better qualified than the 
average of the country they leave and indeed more qualified than the 
average Londoner.  A large proportion, especially from poorer countries, 
initially only achieve jobs with a status/income significantly below that of the 
equivalently educated UK population.  Over time this differential is reduced 
until migrants and indigenous workers generally obtain similar incomes for 
similar education and experience.   
 
Migrants are employed in all sectors of the London economy, but those from 
poorer countries tend to be employed disproportionately in lower paid and 
less stable sectors including hotels/catering and construction.  Even when the 
level of education is taken into account, migrants are on average less likely to 
be in jobs.  Recent A8 migrants are an exception, with notably high 
employment rates.  
 
Since 2000, despite continuing output growth in London, high rates of 
immigration in London have not been matched by substantial employment 
growth.  There is evidence that new in-migrants increase the elasticity of 
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supply of workers in lower paid occupations to the point where wage levels 
there have been seriously eroded as compared to the rest of the UK and the 
cost of living.  This has a positive effect on the competitiveness of the London 
economy but there are also costs for existing workers in the industry who are 
worse paid and have less opportunity to move on to better paid jobs.  
 
Migration and the housing market 
Net in-migration is a major source of the projected increase in households 
that need to be accommodated in London.  New migrants, however, are less 
likely to form separate households than the indigenous population with similar 
attributes.  They are also more likely to be in the private rented sector.  On 
both counts new migrants on average consume less housing per person.  
  
The lower incomes that newer migrants earn also mean that they consume 
less housing.  As incomes increase and households become more stable, 
demand for housing also increases.  Many migrants from richer countries will 
return home, however, and be replaced by others with lower demands.  
Migrants from poorer countries are usually in lower paid jobs.  They are 
therefore, more likely to remain in private rental or to enter the social rented 
sector.  Entry into the social sector is a function of family circumstances and 
income rather than of ethnicity or migrant status. 
 
Private sector rents have risen quite slowly over the last few years.  This 
suggests that the elasticity of supply has been enough to take up the 
increased demands from migrants.  At the top end of the market it is clear 
that foreign (not primarily migrant) investment demand is generating 
additional pressure on house prices.   
 
Overall, the impact of migration on the housing market depends significantly 
on their incomes and on how rapidly migrants turnover as well as on how 
many other households are displaced to other parts of the country.  In the 
main migrants increase the efficient use of London’s housing stock.  They are 
also, however, a major factor determining London’s requirements for 
additional housing, and because many migrants are poorly paid they also 
significantly increase the need for social housing.   
 
Migrants, public finance and local services 
Migrants can either increase or reduce public expenditure, depending on 
their needs.  Single and more affluent immigrants may use few services, while 
poorer ones with families may require help from local authorities, the NHS and 
other providers.  In the early years, many migrants tend to use few services 
compared to the indigenous population, though those that become more 
established, for example if they have a family, may come to increase their 
service needs.   
 
A minority of migrant households, particularly those asylum seekers and 
refugees that are enabled to remain in London, may make significant 
demands on local public services, notably through a need for housing, 
language assistance, health services and social security.  There is evidence of 
a developing conflict between traditional needs-based service allocations 
and a perception that in-migrants are moving ahead of established residents 
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in the queue for services.  This conflict has implications for social cohesion, 
including the possibility that voters may turn to extremist political parties. 
 
A key difference between the public service impacts of in-migrants to London 
and those to American cities such as New York is that the system of public 
finance in Britain means local authorities do not benefit from immigration 
through higher tax yields.  Costs associated with in-migration are 
concentrated at the local level, while the Exchequer enjoys any additional 
tax payments resulting from increased economic activity. 
 
There is also a policy mismatch between central government’s control of 
immigration and the local need for policies to deliver integration and ‘social 
cohesion’.  National politicians oversee the UK’s border controls, yet local 
councillors face most of the demands for management of the issues thrown 
up by in-migration.     
 
7.3 What we still need to know    
The current data on migrant flows are surprisingly limited and of varying 
timeliness and accuracy.  They do not allow detailed analysis of most of the 
questions that commentators wish to examine.  The definition of ‘migrant’ on 
which most numbers are based, mixes together flows of the UK-born and 
foreign-born, and takes as its criterion whether people believe on entry that 
that they will stay in the destination country for at least a year.  This is not most 
people’s understanding of the term migrant, nor does it have any particular 
meaning in relation to housing or labour market processes.   
 
In order for policy-makers, and the electorate, to respond intelligently to the 
opportunities and challenges presented by the likelihood of continuing large 
scale migration into London, we need to know much more about a number 
of things.  Basic among these are the actual mobility patterns of migrants 
(within the country as well as across national borders) and how these vary 
between different groups.  We also need a stronger base of longitudinal data 
with which to understand the processes of adaptation in migrants’ housing 
and labour market careers, and in their human capital and productivity.  
 
A key point is that these migrants are diverse and cannot be seen simply in 
relation to one or a few stereotypes of their position in labour or housing 
markets or in relation to the city more generally.  One group about whose 
situation and impact some general things could be said are those new 
entrants concentrated in the lower end of the labour market.  There are still 
some very important questions to be addressed about this minority 
particularly in relation to their crowding into the bottom rung of occupations 
and the rather low employment rates of many.  We need to understand 
much more about how their potential might be better used and how the 
perverse distributional effects of this crowding can be mitigated – whether by 
stronger promotion of a London Minimum Wage (as identified by the Mayor) 
or by easing access of the new migrants to the kinds of jobs that their formal 
qualifications should support, or by some other initiative.  
 
Beyond this group, however, it requires substantially more effort to understand 
how the integration of the majority of migrants into a wide range of roles 
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within the London economy, affects the full range of labour and housing 
market outcomes, the productivity of London businesses and the stability of 
the economy.  Some of this can probably only be pursued through careful 
econometric analysis, both at the aggregate level and with micro-data.  For 
many questions, the key will be get beyond the stereotype of the ‘migrant’, 
with case studies focused on particular groups and niches.   
 
7.4 Two perspectives on the recent migration to London  
In thinking about the net contribution of the new migrants to the London 
economy, it is useful to distinguish two quite different perspectives on how this 
migration could be expected to contribute to the economy.  The first is in 
terms of its impact on the size of the city – what might be called the growth 
perspective, while the second involves its effect on the city’s population mix –
the mobility perspective.   
 
The ‘growth perspective’ appears the simpler, being just a question of 
numbers, though the potential benefits it suggests involve a combination of 
two ideas.  First, that there are dynamic economies of scale to be exploited 
with a continuously growing labour force; and secondly that a more elastic 
supply of labour permits continuing growth without risking a wage inflation 
that might undermine competitiveness.  
 
The obvious downsides to migration according to this perspective are that 
competition for limited sets of opportunities or resources may impose costs on 
existing residents and/or generate price inflation, and that a more elastic 
supply of labour may depress wages, at least for those natives in most direct 
competition with migrants.  The existing literature, both internationally and in 
relation to the UK as a whole suggests that any effects in relation to earnings 
or employment are likely to be small.  In the London case at least it does, 
however, seem that there are rather strong downward pressures on earnings 
of those at the bottom end of the labour market.  Some will see this result as a 
bad thing, others as a positive one.      
 
In relation to the housing market and the demand for a constrained supply of 
space within the city, the issues are different. There appear, however, to be 
effects on inflation and the need for social housing to set against potential 
gains from growth, of which there is little clear evidence. 
 
The ‘mobility perspective’, on the other hand, sees London’s competitive 
position as resting essentially on its ability to continue to attract (and train) the 
best and the brightest talent, to secure creativity through deploying the 
broadest sets of skills and cultural backgrounds, to sustain its global economic 
role through securing people with high level international experience and 
links, and to be able to respond rapidly and flexibly to shifting market 
opportunities and pressures.  
 
Given what we know about the comparative performance of cities, and the 
subjective responses of those most closely involved, this offers a very credible 
perspective on the contribution that high rates of in- and out-migration could 
make to London’s future dynamism, and the quality of life it could offer its 
residents.  It is the key argument that city leaders and others adduce in favour 
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of immigration, and there is no doubt that the vibrancy and sense of 
excitement offered by the leading global cities of today rests, in part, on the 
existence of a large and changing migrant population.  Much more work, 
however, is clearly required to establish exactly how and to what degree 
diversity and mobility, in their various forms, actually contribute to innovation, 
competitiveness and the quality of life in London; and on the other side of the 
picture, what the costs are, who bears them and how these should be 
mitigated.  These are complex issues, on which existing research barely 
scratches the surface.  They are extremely important, since it is in these terms, 
rather than in relation to quantitative growth within a physically constrained 
city, that the net benefits of international migration and mobility are likely to 
be found.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1:  Official statistics 
In UK official statistics there are currently two basic sources of data on 
migration, feeding into the ONS’ Total International Migration (TIM) series32: 
 
• The International Passenger Survey (IPS), a voluntary  questionnaire 
covering a sample of all those passing through designated international 
ports and airports – other than asylum seekers (respondents include some 
45 thousand foreign arrivals and 100 thousand or so UK departures); and 
 
• Home Office administrative records, covering asylum seekers plus those 
who formally change their residence status subsequent to arrival in the 
country. 
 
The IPS distinguishes migrants (in and out) from visitors on the basis of their 
intended duration of stay in the destination country, applying the 
internationally agreed (UN) definition of a long-term migrant, as someone 
staying in a country for a period of a year or more.  (This includes around 5% 
of the foreign arrivals surveyed by the IPS but only 1% of the UK departures).  
Visitor switchers are those who subsequently extend their period of stay 
beyond a year, while (conversely) migrant switchers are those who originally 
intended to stay for a year, but actually leave before then.  In terms of their 
relationship to the housing and labour markets, the significance of this 
distinction is obviously not clear-cut.  
 
Visitors are by no means all tourists, students or family friends housed in hotels, 
halls of residence or spare beds, but often accommodated within the 
mainstream housing market, as tenants in their own right (if not as owners).  
Similarly, by no means all visitors are economically inactive, since this 
category includes people on short-term attachments or working holidays, 
seasonal migrant workers, students working part-time and other types of 
transient worker.  On the other side, others staying for over a year (but not 
permanently) may very well live in student halls/spare rooms and suspend 
involvement in the labour market for the period of their stay.  The UN now 
distinguishes a category of ‘short-term migrant’ staying in a country for 
between 3 and 12 months for purposes other than recreation, business, visits 
to friends, treatment or pilgrimage.  There are no published UK estimates at 
present for the size of this group, but IPS data suggest that the number of 
short-term migrants (on this UN definition) coming into the country is about 4 
times that of the longer term migrants appearing in the current statistics, while 
the number of short-term UK out-migrants is about 5 times the currently 
recorded number of (long-term) out-migrants.  
 
Application of these categories to counting of the different groups is 
complicated by their legal rights.  For example, EEA citizens do not require 
work permits, which can affect declared estimates of duration of stay – 
though there are transitional arrangements for citizens of the 10 EU accession 
                                                 
32 Going back to 1991, before which continuous data are effectively limited to figures from the 
IPS.   
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(or A10) countries.  Irish flows are also treated separately because these are 
not effectively covered by the IPS (or passport control), and are covered 
primarily from the Irish National Household Survey.  The case of asylum seekers 
is particularly complicated, since some family members may be covered by 
multiple applications and outflows of failed asylum seekers (other than by 
removal) may or may not be captured by the IPS33.  For all types of migrant, 
elements of estimation are required to supplement and interpret the basic 
sources, but these are less readily applied to those leaving the UK (whether 
primary emigrants or return migrants) who are not directly covered by any UK 
surveys other than the IPS.  
 
The latest available TIM estimates are for 2005, when the total international 
inflow into the UK as a whole is estimated at 565 thousand, of whom 501 
thousand come from the IPS count and Irish inflows, while 27 thousand were 
asylum seekers (much below the peak levels of 1999-2002) and another 38 
thousand represented the net effect of switches between visitor and migrant 
status.  The corresponding outflow was estimated at 380 thousand, of which 
343 thousand came from the IPS/Irish flow figures, with 15 thousand returning 
asylum seekers and a net shift of 21 thousand from visitor to migrant status.  
The net inflow (on a TIM basis) is estimated by the ONS at just 185 thousand.  
On a country of birth basis, the IPS data suggests a net inflow in 2005 of some 
258 thousand people who were born abroad, alongside a net outflow of 
some 90 thousand of the UK-born.       
 
A range of supplementary sources allow some cross-checking and/or provide 
contextual information on the flows indicated by these basic sources – 
though none actually distinguish ‘migrants’ in the same way.  In particular, for 
Population Census years, this source provides what should be complete data 
on all of those ‘usual residents’ of the UK who had been living outside the 
country 12 months previously.  The LFS offers a comparable array of data 
covering only a sample of the population (and excluding those in non-private 
establishments or who have arrived in the last 6 months), but allowing the 
stock of earlier migrants (identified by year of arrival) to be distinguished.  In 
addition, there are data on new registrations with NHS GPs (Flag 4), and issues 
of new National Insurance numbers (NINOs), while counts are also available 
on a local basis for certificates issued to employed A8 migrants/visitors under 
the WRS34. 
 
Official immigration series do not currently attempt to estimate the scale of 
illegal migration into the UK, but it is believed that the great majority of such 
migrants are likely to be covered by statistical censuses and surveys (including 
the LFS).  On this basis, an official review of potential methods of estimating 
the size of the illegal/unauthorised immigrant population (Pinkerton et al., 
2004) led to adoption of a version of the US’s Residual Method – whereby 
                                                 
33 In the light of such issues, the methodology for estimating Total International Migration (TIM) 
was substantially revised from 2003, though data on the new basis are available only for years 
from 1991(ONS, 2003). 
34 The WRS data unlike the other sources counts jobs (one certificate per job) taken by 
nationals of A8 countries (the eight EU accession countries from central/eastern Europe), with 
exemptions for those who have already worked continuously for 12 months in the UK (as well as 
for the self-employed).  It is not clear, therefore how it should relate to either the stock or flow of 
A8 workers in the UK 
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estimates of the total foreign-born population based on the Census (with 
some allowance for the potential margin of undercounting of illegals) are 
compared with independent estimates of the legally resident foreign-born 
population – to generate estimates for 2001 of the stock of illegal migrants in 
the population (Woodbridge, 2005).  On ONS advice, these assumed that the 
Census missed between 0 and 20% of the unauthorised foreign-born 
population, leading to an estimate that this group would have accounted in 
2001 for between 310 and 570 thousand people, representing between 9 and 
15% of the total foreign-born population in the UK35.  This is substantially less 
than the estimated numbers of temporary and quasi-legal immigrants, which 
are put in the range 716 to 772 thousand.   
 
MigrationWatch UK, the leading independent critics of immigration policy, 
make the point that the UK-born children of illegal migrants are excluded 
from these estimates.  More importantly, they suggest that since 2001 the 
population of illegal migrants is likely to have grown by some 200 thousand 
because of the large number of failed asylum seekers, rather few of whom 
appear to have left the country (MWUK, 2005).  What is at issue here, is, 
however, primarily the legal status of recent immigrants to the country rather 
than their numbers36.  Overall, MigrationWatch accept that: 
 
‘the (2001) Census should provide an accurate snapshot of 
immigration to the UK.  The ONS international migration methodology, 
having been independently compared against the census output, 
should also be quite robust’ (MWUK, 2007, para. 20).  
 
Translating estimates of migrant flows to a regional or local basis presents 
particular difficulties, since destinations within the UK reported to the IPS may 
well turn out not to be the final, permanent ones where in-migrants settle.  A 
particular case is that of asylum seekers requiring public support with housing, 
whose recorded location is that to which (since 2000) they have been 
‘dispersed’ – away from areas of excess housing demand – though an 
uncertain proportion of these are believed to filter back toward London.  A 
much more general issue for London follows from the fact that for over 80% of 
in-migrants the point of arrival in the UK is within the London metropolitan 
region.  The recording of a temporary address somewhere within London 
(often in central areas) for migrants who rapidly settle elsewhere seems the 
most likely explanation for a large discrepancy between the IPS and the 
(post-move) Census or LFS in the share of UK immigrants attributed to London.   
 
In 2000-1, for which all sources are available, the IPS estimated London’s share 
at 35%, as against 30% in both the Census and the LFS (Rendall et al, 2003).  In 
subsequent years the LFS has continued to record a significantly lower London 
share than the IPS.  It now seems to be accepted by official statisticians that 
the IPS (and thus the TIMs series also), significantly over-estimated international 
migration into London (both gross and net), leading to inflated estimates of 
                                                 
35 The equivalent US estimate (using the same methodology, but after several amnesties for 
illegals to regularise their position) was around 9 million (Pinkerton et al., 2004), representing 
about one quarter of the foreign-born population. 
36 MWUK (2005) argue that the ONS is over-optimistic in its assumption that 10% of this group 
have left the country, which would have some small effect on the TIM estimates.   
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population in several London boroughs which then had to be revised down 
when 2001 Census results became available.  A central/local working party 
(Central Local Government Information Partnership Sub-Group (CLIP), 2006) 
recommended revisions for each of the years 1999-2002, reducing London’s 
share of the gross inflow by between 3 and 5% (i.e. by 14-25 thousand p.a.), 
and indicative estimates have now been presented of forthcoming revisions 
to post-Census population estimates 2002-5 ONS (2007b) which involve 
reductions of 10-22 thousand p.a. in the estimated inflow into Greater London 
(principally affecting Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea). 
 
In this report, we lean heavily on the LFS as a source of data on the impacts of 
international migration in London.  A major reason is that concerns with 
sampling error in the IPS have inhibited publication of any sub-national 
information from this source about the origins, age, occupations and 
qualifications of migrants.  The sample of one-year migrants in the LFS is 
actually rather smaller (though increased with its consolidation in the new 
APS.  Its particular strength, however, is that it also distinguishes those who 
have moved into the country in each preceding year, thus both extending 
the numbers of migrants for whom substantial information is available, in 
relation specifically to their post-migration characteristics – and also some 
indirect information about likely differences between the migrants who move 
away again, and those who stay in the UK.   
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Appendix 2:  Definitions  
 
Migrants: Those moving to another country for a stay of one year or over.  For 
counts at the time of entry this relates to the stated intention of the mover, 
which may or may not prove accurate.  On a proposed United Nations (UN) 
definition, this group would be labelled ‘long-term migrants’.  There are no 
operational measures of permanent migrants, i.e. people moving to a new 
country and remaining there for the rest of their lives.  Migrants into a country 
may include people born there (and/or with its nationality) if they have lived 
elsewhere for a year or more. 
 
Operational definitions for UK migration 
International Passenger Survey (IPS) estimates are based on samples of 
travellers (other than asylum seekers) stating their intention to stay a year 
or more;  
 
Total International Migration (TIM) adds to this estimates of new asylum-
seekers, together with travellers to/from Ireland and corrects 
retrospectively for switches between migrant and visitor status; 
 
Post-migration surveys, including the Census, Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
and Annual Population Survey (APS) record numbers present among a 
population excluding most types of visitor, who entered the country 
during a specific prior period (one year for the Census).  The LFS/APS 
estimates that we use include only foreign-born migrants into the UK.  
 
Visitors: Those moving to another country for a period of less than one year.  A 
proposed UN definition would distinguish among these between those who 
stay for less than 3 moths and/or come for purposes of recreation, business, 
visits to friends, treatment or pilgrimage – representing a more restricted 
category of ‘visitor’ – and all others staying for less than a year who would be 
classed as ‘short-term migrants’.  Such short-term migrants may be 
functionally indistinguishable from those staying over 12 months and thus 
being counted as migrants. 
 
Asylum seekers: Migrants claiming a right to enter the country under the UN 
convention protecting refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution in 
their home country, and whose case to remain has yet to be determined. 
 
Refugees: Formally those who have succeeded in their application for asylum, 
but more generally all those arriving as asylum seekers who remain in the 
country, whether with recognition as refugees, given special leave to remain, 
still awaiting determination of their cases, or notwithstanding the failure of 
their cases. 
 
Foreign born: All those born outside the UK, irrespective of when they arrived 
in the country.  If visitors are effectively excluded, these represent lifetime 
migrants, some of whom will have been in the UK for decades.  This group 
excludes children of foreign-born parents, born in the UK subsequent to their 
parent’s migration.   
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Mobile households: Those that have moved in the last year.  This category 
includes those who have moved within and between areas, as well as those 
who have moved from outside the UK.  International migrants who 
subsequently move from one area to another within the country will not then 
be identified as international migrants.   
 
Ethnic minorities: People identified as (or identifying themselves as) members 
of a particular ethnic group, other than ‘white British’, irrespective of their own 
place of birth or citizenship.  A majority of the members of such minorities in 
the UK are not themselves migrants, though most will be 2nd or 3rd generation 
descendants of migrants.  Most (foreign-born) migrants into the UK will be 
members of ethnic minorities in the broad sense (i.e. not white British by 
descent), but a large proportion of recent migrants will not be members of 
non-white ethnic minorities. 
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Abbreviations 
 
A8  The 8 eastern and central European accession countries of the 
EU25, i.e. Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
A10 the 10 new accession countries of the EU25 (A8 plus Malta and 
Cyprus)  
APS   Annual Population Survey 
EEA European Economic Area (the EU plus Iceland, Lichtenstein and 
Norway – plus, for migration purposes only, Switzerland) 
EU15  The 15 nations of the EU prior to the 2004 expansion 
EU25  The 25 current member nations of the EU  
IPS  International Passenger Survey 
LFS  Labour Force Survey 
NES  New Earnings Survey 
NINOs  National Insurance Number registrations for overseas nationals 
TIM Total International Migration (the current official migration series, 
including asylum seekers, and adjusted for status switchers) 
WRS Worker Registration Scheme (applied to A8 migrants) 
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The City of London is exceptional in many ways, not least in
that it has a dedicated local authority committed to
enhancing its status on the world stage. The smooth running
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extend far beyond the City boundaries. It runs the
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manages a portfolio of property throughout the capital,
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and around it.
The City of London Corporation, however, never loses sight
of its primary role – the sustained and expert promotion of
the ‘City’, a byword for strength and stability, innovation
and flexibility – and it seeks to perpetuate the City’s
position as a global business leader into the new century.
